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General introduction
The thesis presents a collection of articles in the area of productivityand eﬃciency .
It consists of two independent parts, which are connected bythe common subject
of productivityand eﬃciency .
Part I of the thesis treats the alternative approaches to the measurement of total
factor productivity(TFP) growth and its decomposition. I discuss the assumptions
underlying the diﬀerent measures of TFP growth and the conditions under which
theyare equivalent. The interrelationship b etween the diﬀerent measures provides
an interpretation of their similarities and dissimilarities. The interpretation of the
productivityindices becomes especiallyimportant in empirical applications. In this
part I oﬀer two examples of such applications. I analyze the sectoral productivity
performance in industrialized countries and identifythe sources of TFP growth.
Part II approaches the issue of productivityand eﬃciencyfrom a diﬀerent per-
spective, which reﬂects the recent shift in myresearch interests towards incentive
regulation. The issue of evaluating the productivityand eﬃciencyperformance of
companies is veryimportant in the context of regulation. With incentive-based
regulation becoming more popular, quite a few regulatoryoﬃces started to apply
diﬀerent benchmarking techniques (for example, Data Envelopment Analysis) to
quantifythe diﬀerences in productivityof regulated companies. The results of these
analyses have been used in designing incentive schemes that would force regulated
companies to improve their performance in terms of productivityand eﬃciency .
Here, the buzz-word is yardstick competition. I apply such a scheme to the regula-
tion of network monopolies and address related optimal incentives issues.
12 1. General introduction
1.1 Part I. TFP growth and its sources
The ﬁrst part of the thesis deals with various methodological aspects of the mea-
surement of total factor productivitygrowth. I review a few diﬀerent approaches
to the concept of TFP growth, namelyIndex Numbers, Data Envelopment Analy sis
(DEA) and Input-Output Analysis, and establish links among them. Furthermore, I
consider theoretical models leading to new decompositions of TFP growth, allowing
me to identifythe sources of productivitygrowth.
I summarize the contribution of each chapter below.
1.1.1 Contribution of chapter 2:Review of approaches to
the measurement of TFP growth
This chapter reviews diﬀerent approaches to the measurement of TFP growth and
interrelates them. The point of departure is the macroeconomic concept of the
Solow Residual and I explain its relation to alternative measures of TFP growth,
particularly, to those applied with a more micro orientation.
I focus on Index Numbers, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Input-Output
Analysis. The latter two are especially important in the context of this thesis because
theyprovide the basis for the models considered in chapters 3 and 4.
It appears that the treatment of prices represents the main conceptual diﬀerence
between the DEA and the traditional Index Number approaches. The traditional
productivityindices rest on the assumption of competitive pricing. Consequently ,
observable value shares are used as weights in aggregation.
This is in contrast to DEA, which does not assume prices to be competitive.
The corresponding TFP growth measure - the Malmquist index - is based on funda-
mentals of the economies and employs shadow price information obtained from the
linear program that determines the production possibilityfrontier and the reference
point on the frontier for a given observation.
The Input-Output analytic framework allows us to take into account intersec-
toral linkages and provides a measure of TFP growth that is conceptuallyclose to
the macroeconomic Solow residual (based on observable value shares). The incor-
poration of shadow information obtained from the general equilibrium model yields
an alternative measure of TFP growth, which is close to the measure resulting from
DEA.1.1. Part I. TFP growth and its sources 3
Measures of TFP growth that assume no optimizing behavior allow us to fac-
tor in eﬃciencychange. In particular, the Malmquist indices can be decomposed
into technical change and eﬃciencychange. The technical change component of
the Malmquist indices represents a shift of the production frontier and resembles
the Solow residual measure. The eﬃciencychange component reﬂects movements
towards the frontier. This decomposition of the Malmquist index will be elaborated
in chapter 4, where I applyboth sequential and contemporaneous Malmquist in-
dices. A combination of the two will lead to a further decomposition, identifying
the business-cycle component of TFP growth.
Furthermore, the incorporation of information on international trade allows us
to separate the so-called terms-of-trade eﬀect on TFP growth. The TFP growth
decomposition is thus augmented with a third term reﬂecting the contribution of
international trade. The model considered in chapter 3 applies this ideas.
1.1.2 Contribution of chapter 3:General Equilibrium of In-
ternational TFP growth rates
Chapter 3 presents a studyof the total factor productivity(TFP) performance in
three major economies: the US, Japan and Europe. I consider a general equilibrium
model of the three economies, linked byinternational trade. This model is then used
to estimate their TFP growth at the sectoral and the aggregate level.
The model is based on the fundamentals of the economies; it employs only data
on input-output ﬂows, factor inputs across sectors, endowments of primaryinputs,
consumption, and trade patterns. Optimal ﬁnal demand vectors are obtained by
proportional expansions of observable ﬁnal demand vectors, given the constraint
on technology, endowments of primary inputs and trade surplus. The expansion of
demand is achieved byreallocation of scarce resources across sectors of the economies
and improving the pattern of international trade.
All prices are endogenous. Theyare obtained as shadow prices from the model’s
linear program and then used to measure TFP growth. TFP growth is evaluated at
shadow prices and decomposed into technical change, eﬃciencychange and terms-
of-trade eﬀects.
The empirical analysis based on this model produces a technical change eﬀect
that is highlycorrelated with the conventional Solow residual measure based on
observable prices. This result lends support to the use of the standard measure of4 1. General introduction
technological change.
1.1.3 Contribution of chapter 4:Sequential Malmquist in-
dices of productivity growth:an application to OECD
industrial activities
Chapter 4 deals with Malmquist indices and their decompositions. It emphasizes
the relevance of the correct interpretation of the latter to the understanding of
the processes that underlie productivitychanges. The point is illustrated with the
analysis of the evolution of productivity in a few developed countries over the period
of 1970-90.
I applyboth the DEA methodologywith contemporaneous frontiers and the
less standard DEA with sequential frontiers. The associated industrial Malmquist
productivityindices are decomposed into technical change and eﬃciencychange
terms, which represent the well-known sources of productivitygrowth, ‘technical
progress’ and ‘catching up’.
Sequential DEA implies that the frontier can onlyshift outward, while in a
contemporaneous setting both inward and outward frontier shifts are possible. Most
of DEA literature applies the second approach. However, for the industries in which
technological regress is unlikelyto o ccur, DEA with sequential frontiers provides
a more adequate measure for the contribution of technical changes than standard
DEA.
In this chapter I interrelate the alternative Malmquist indices in a unifying frame-
work that provides an interpretation to their diﬀerence. The consequent decompo-
sition of TFP growth combines three terms; namelytechnical progress, catching-up
and the business cycle eﬀects.
1.2 Part II. Incentive regulation and productivity
performance
In this part I will focus on the regulation of natural monopolies in the utilitysector.
In manycountries the utilitysector has alreadybeen restructured and deregulated
as to introduce competition, at least in activities where it is sustainable. In most Eu-
ropean countries the utilitysector, which has traditionallybeen a public monopoly ,1.2. Part II. Incentive regulation and productivity performance 5
has been split verticallyinto separate segments - production, transportation over
the network, and supply(or retail). While production and supplyactivities are con-
sidered to be competitive (at least potentially), the transportation activity operated
byregional monopolists remains monopolybusiness. Therefore, a regulatorybody
is typically assigned to ensure eﬃcient pricing and performance.
One aspect of the performance of a regulated network companythat appears to
be important, but is diﬃcult to incorporate in the regulatoryframework in practice
is the qualityof supply . The model that I present in part II deals with this issue. The
proposed regulation scheme is shown to achieve the optimal qualityof supply , while
providing the companies with an incentive to improve their production eﬃciency.
1.2.1 Contribution of chapter 5:Review of literature on
regulation
In chapter 5 I review the main problems that arise in regulation of regional natural
monopolies and the corresponding literature on the theoryof regulation.
The keyissue in the regulation theoryis solving informational asy mmetrybe-
tween the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms. The historyof regulation oﬀers diﬀerent
approaches to deal with it. For example, in the traditional (the so-called ‘cost-plus’)
regulation ﬁrms are compensated for their incurred costs, including a return on as-
sets that is set bythe regulator. Thus the regulator disallows the ﬁrms to charge
excessive returns on their investment. Another example would be a more recent
scheme, referred to as ‘price-cap’, in which the regulator caps the revenues of regu-
lated ﬁrms to stimulate the ﬁrms to cut the costs and therefore improve eﬃciency
of their operation.
We will discuss the incentive properties of diﬀerent regulatoryapproaches and
their impact on the qualityof services provided byregulated ﬁrms.
1.2.2 Contribution of chapter 6:The model of yardstick
competition of network utilities
Regulated prices of network services, such as the provision of electricity, gas and
water, have traditionallybeen based on the own costs of companies. Recentlya few
regulatorybodies in Europe started to use regimes that unlink prices from costs.
In some of these high-powered incentive schemes (referred to as ‘yardstick competi-6 1. General introduction
tion’) price caps are based on the performance of other companies, giving companies
strong incentives to reduce their own costs. While these incentives can have a ben-
eﬁcial impact on costs in the short run, theymight have an adverse eﬀect on the
reliabilityof services in the long run, at least without proper qualityregulation. To
curb such undesirable eﬀects, yardstick competition should be augmented with some
mechanism regulating quality.
This chapter shows how forms of yardstick competition can be extended as to
incorporate the aspect of reliability. In particular, we will demonstrate that a yard-
stick competition scheme that does not penalize network failures, is suboptimal and
leads to underinvestment. In contrast, the socially-optimal outcome can be achieved
byintroducing penalties for undersupplywhich are equal to the value of the associ-
ated losses perceived bythe customers. The potentiallyexternal costs of inadequate
supplyare thus internalized bythe companies and hence taken into account in in-
vestment decision making. Given that the regulator does not observe the ﬁrm’s
technology, the main problem is to determine prices such that utilities have suﬃ-
cient expected revenue to cover both the eﬃcient cost and the risk of shortfall, which
will be reﬂected in ﬁnes that must be paid occasionally. This problem can be solved
byintroducing a y ardstick competition regime and augmenting it as to incorporate
the risk of network failure. Since we assume ﬁrms to be capable of achieving the
common minimum installation cost, the proposed regulation scheme emerges as ﬁrst
best.Part I
TFP growth and its sources
7Chapter 2
R e v i e wo fa p p r o a c h e st ot h e
measurement of TFP growth
2.1 Introduction
This introductorychapter gives an overview of the diﬀerent approaches that are
adopted in the literature on measuring total factor productivity(TFP) growth. I will
touch upon the Index Number Approach commonlyapplied bymacroeconomists,
Input-Output Analysis (IO), and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The latter
two are especiallyrelevant in the context of this thesis, as theyprovide the basis for
the models considered in chapters 3 and 4. I will discuss links among the approaches
and their relations to the macroeconomic concept of Solow Residual.
It appears that the treatment of prices represents the main conceptual diﬀerence
between the approaches. The traditional productivityindices rest on the assumption
of observable prices being competitive: factors are paid according to their marginal
products. Consequently, when measuring TFP growth, observed value shares are
used as weights in aggregation.
This is in contrast to DEA, which does not assume prices to be competitive. The
corresponding TFP growth measure - the Malmquist index - is based on fundamen-
tals of the economies and employs shadow price information obtained from a linear
program that determines the production possibilityfrontier and the reference point
on the frontier for a given observation.
The input-output analysis framework allows us to take into account intersec-
toral linkages and yields a measure of TFP that is conceptually close to the macro-
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economic Solow residual (based on observable value shares). The incorporation of
shadow information obtained from a general equilibrium model provides an alterna-
tive measure for TFP growth, which is close to the measure resulting from DEA.
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, we brieﬂyreview a few diﬀerent
measures of productivitygrowth in section 2.2; and then we establish relationships
among them in section 2.3.
2.2 Approaches to measuring TFP growth
2.2.1 Solow Residual
Total factor productivitygrowth is conventionallydeﬁned as the growth of real
output not explained bythe growth of factor inputs and associated with changes in
technology.
Solow (1957) suggested a framework for measuring technical changes in an econ-
omy. He considered the aggregate production function of the form Y = F(K,L,t),
in which Y , K and L denoted aggregate output, capital and labor, and variable t
stood for time.1 Solow deﬁned technical change as “anykind of shift in the aggregate
production function”2 and proposed a wayof segregating shifts of the production
function from movements along it.
In Solow’s setting, under the assumption that factors are paid according to their
marginal products, technical change is measured as the diﬀerence between the rate
of growth of real output of the economyand the weighted sum of the growth rates
of real inputs (capital and labor). That is, TFP growth is deﬁned byformula
￿ T = ￿ Y − wL￿ L − wK ￿ K (2.1)
in which wL and wK constitute the shares of labor and capital in production. Here
and below ‘hats’ denote growth rates of the corresponding variables, for example,
￿ Y =
1
Y
dY
dt , and notation ￿ T is used for TFP growth.
It is easyto show that under constant returns to scale ￿ T = 1
F
∂F
∂t , therefore,
indeed, ￿ T represents a shift of the production function. In the special case of neutral
1In the original notations by Solow aggregate output was labeled Q instead of Y .
2“...I am using the phrase ‘technical cange’ as a short-hand expression for any kind of shift in
the production function. Thus slowdowns, speedups, improvements in the education of the labor
force, all sorts of things will appear as ‘technical change’ ”(Solow, 1957, p.312.)2.2. Approaches to measuring TFP growth 11
changes (those leaving marginal rates of transformation untouched) in which the
aggregate production function is represented by A(t)f(K,L) with A(t) regarded as
technical coeﬃcient, the formula for TFP growth reduces to
￿ T = ￿ A (2.2)
leading to the interpretation of technical change as a change in the technical coeﬃ-
cient.
Expression (2.1) has been named the Solow residual and referred to as “the
measure of our ignorance”, in other words, the part of output growth that cannot
be explained bythe growth of inputs.
The deﬁnition used bySolow operates with real output and input. Since both
are not homogeneous, the wayof their aggregation becomes crucial. In particular,
Griliches and Jorgenson (1967) argued that the separation of the value of transaction
into price and quantityis conceptuallywrong and leads to errors of measurement
of both real output and real input. According to Griliches and Jorgenson, the
most important errors arise from incorrect aggregation, namely, from using biased
estimates for the implicit rental value of capital and labor services, from incorrect
accounting for changes in investment and consumption goods prices, etc. After
incorporating all those adjustments into their analysis of the US national product
accounts for the twenty-year period following World War II, they concluded that
“if real product and real factor input were accuratelyaccounted for, the observed
rate of growth of total factor productivitywas negligible” 3. In spite of such a
conclusion, the paper byGriliches and Jorgenson did not close the discussion on the
measurement and explanation of TFP growth, but rather stimulated it, inspiring
research on aggregation methods. The next section will present more detail on this.
2.2.2 Index number approach
The formula for the residual introduced in the previous section (2.1) provides a
measure of TFP growth on the level of macro economyand is often used bymacroe-
conomists in their computations of TFP growth. However, as we have already
mentioned, inputs and outputs are not homogeneous. Thus, to compute the growth
of inputs and outputs one must somehow aggregate the data.
3Griliches and Jorgenson (1967) p.250.12 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
Consider multiple inputs (e.g., diﬀerent types of capital and labor) and outputs.
Then formula (2.1) has to be modiﬁed byincorporating index numbers, which results
in a representation of TFP growth as the diﬀerence of output and input quantity
indices
￿ T = ￿ Q(y,p) − ￿ Q(x,w). (2.3)
Here and below notation Q is used for quantityindices, y and x are column vec-
tors of output and input, and p and w are row vectors of output and input prices
correspondingly.
The type of an index depends on the speciﬁcation of Q. Most commonlyused
ones are those of Divisia, T¨ ornqvist and Fisher deﬁned below.
Continuous-time Divisia indices
If ￿ Q(y,p)a n d￿ Q(x,w) are Divisia quantityindices, which we denote by ￿ QD(y,p)a n d
￿ QD(x,w),4 the weights are determined as value shares of the corresponding inputs
(or outputs) in the total input (output) value. That is,
￿ Q
D(y,p)=
￿
i
αi￿ yi (2.4)
￿ Q
D(x,w)=
￿
j
βj￿ xj (2.5)
αi =
piyi
py
,β j =
wjxj
wx
, (2.6)
where yi, pi, xj, wj are coordinates of vectors y, p, x, w. Then the corresponding,
Divisia-based, deﬁnition of TFP growth is expressed as
￿ T
D = ￿ Q
D(y,p) − ￿ Q
D(x,w)=
￿
i
αi￿ yi −
￿
j
βj￿ xj. (2.7)
Griliches and Jorgenson (1967) have shown that under the necessarycondition for
producer equilibrium (all marginal rates of transformation between pairs of inputs
and outputs are equal to the corresponding price ratios) these indices measure shifts
in the production function in case of multiple inputs and outputs. Therefore, indeed,
￿ TD represents technical change as deﬁned bySolow (1957), or as we call it, the Solow
residual.
4Here and below the superscripts attached to ￿ Q and ￿ T refer to the method of measurement; for
example, the upper index D in the above expression refers to ‘Divisia’.2.2. Approaches to measuring TFP growth 13
Griliches and Jorgenson (1967) have also demonstrated that under CRS, given
the fundamental accounting identity py = wx, one can derive a dual deﬁnition
for TFP growth as the diﬀerence of the corresponding price indices (Divisia price
indices). Following them, we obtain
￿ T
D =
￿
j
βj ￿ wj −
￿
i
αi￿ pi = ￿ P
D(x,w) − ￿ P
D(y,p), (2.8)
where notation ￿ P D stands for Divisia price indices of input and output of the econ-
omy.
Notice that the latter formula is equivalent to
￿
j βj
￿
￿ wj − ￿ PD(y,p)
￿
,i nw h i c h
βj is the share of factor j in production and
￿
￿ wj − ￿ PD(y,p)
￿
denotes the growth of
the real marginal product of this factor. This representation imputes productivity
growth to factors of production, justifying the name for the residual: total factor pro-
ductivitygrowth. For example, in the case of the aggregate production function with
two inputs labor and capital, as in Solow (1957), TFP growth can be represented
as the sum of the growth of productivityof labor and capital, ￿ TD = βL￿ wL+βK ￿ wK.
The dual deﬁnition of TFP growth will be used in chapter 3, where we deﬁne an
alternative measure of TFP growth based on shadow prices.
T¨ ornqvist and Fisher indices
The continuous-time Divisia indices introduced above have to be approximated in
practice. Manyempirical applications do this bymeans of the T¨ ornqvist indices.
The latter are also known as translog indices, because Diewert (1978) related them
to the translog production function.
Given data on inputs, outputs and value shares in periods t and t+1, the translog
quantityindices, ￿ QT
y and ￿ QT
x, are expressed as follows
￿ Q
T
y = ￿ Q
T(y
t,y
t+1,α
t,α
t+1)=
￿
i
1
2
(α
t
i + α
t+1
i )(lny
t+1
i − lny
t
i) (2.9)
￿ Q
T
x = ￿ Q
T(x
t,x
t+1,β
t,β
t+1)=
￿
i
1
2
(β
t
j + β
t+1
j )(lnx
t+1
j − lnx
t
j), (2.10)
where the value shares in each time are deﬁned the same wayas before, i.e.,
αt
i =
pt
iyt
i
ptyt, β
t
j =
wt
jxt
j
wtxt and similarlyfor α
t+1
i , β
t+1
j . The corresponding T¨ ornqvist
productivityindex, ￿ T T, is constructed as the diﬀerence of the corresponding output14 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
and input quantityindices, in accordance with (2.3)
￿ T
T = ￿ Q
T
y − ￿ Q
T
x. (2.11)
Another commonlyused productivityindex is the Fisher index advocated by
Diewert (1992), who for the ﬁrst time suggested using this type of indices for mea-
suring productivitygrowth. In accordance with this index, the rate of TFP growth
is expressed as the diﬀerence between the rates of growth of the Fisher output index
and the Fisher input index
￿ T
F =l n￿ Q
F
y − ln ￿ Q
F
x. (2.12)
The latter are constructed as the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche
quantityindices. For example, for output we have
￿ Q
F
y = ￿ Q
F(y
t,y
t+1,p
t,p
t+1)=
￿
￿ Q
L
y ￿ Q
P
y
￿1/2
,
where
￿ Q
L
y =
ptyt+1
ptyt
￿ Q
P
y =
pt+1yt+1
pt+1yt .
Similar expressions can be constructed for input.
As shown byDiewert (1992), Fisher productivityindices are economicallyjus-
tiﬁed in the sense that there exists a certain production structure from which they
could be derived. The necessaryassumptions are that of competitive revenue maxi-
mizing and cost minimizing behavior and the underlying technology being described
bya certain class of functional forms. In addition to that, Fisher indices are known to
have a few desirable features, in particular, theysatisfythe so-called factor reversal
property, which the T¨ ornqvist index fails. The factor reversal propertyguarantees
a correct decomposition of value change into price and quantitychanges, which is
veryimportant for a correct measurement of productivitychange and preserving the
dualitybetween the measure (2.7) based on quantities and (2.8) referring to prices.
Comparing the two indices, Diewert (1992) has shown that although conceptually
the Fisher-type productivity index performs the best, in most practical applications
in the time-series context both T¨ ornqvist and Fisher indices yield similar numerical
values.2.2. Approaches to measuring TFP growth 15
2.2.3 Input-Output Analysis and measuring TFP growth
In this section we will turn to the approach to TFP measurement adopted byInput-
Output literature. This literature considers an economyas a sy stem of sectors
linked byproduction processes. Therefore, the measure of TFP growth encom-
passes intersectoral linkages. In particular, intermediate inputs are introduced into
consideration.
Let us assume that the economyconsists of n sectors, each producing a certain
commodityand using other commodities as intermediate inputs. According to the
national accounting identity
pjyj =
￿
i
piyij +
￿
k
wkxkj, (2.13)
where i,j =1 ,2,...n, yj is the gross output of sector j, pj is its price, yij is the
quantityof intermediate input supplied to sector j from sector i at price pi, xkj
is the quantityof primaryinput k engaged in production in sector j, with the
corresponding price wk. Primaryinputs are ty picallylabor and capital and their
prices are assumed to be uniform within the economy.
In the Input-Output Analysis framework the rate of sectoral productivity growth,
￿ tj, is conventionallydeﬁned as the diﬀerence of the growth rates of output and inputs.
It is derived from (2.13) and expressed as
￿ tj = ￿ yj − (pjyj)
−1
￿
￿
i
piyij￿ yij +
￿
k
wkxkj￿ xkj
￿
. (2.14)
Introducing the technical coeﬃcients aij =( yj)−1yij, bkj =( yj)−1xkj, we obtain the
equivalent expression for total factor productivitygrowth as a weighted sum of the
reductions in technical coeﬃcients
￿ tj = −p
−1
j
￿
￿
i
pi￿ aij +
￿
k
wk￿ bkj
￿
. (2.15)
Therefore, similarlyto the pair of formulae (2.1) and (2.2) considered in section 2.2.1,
we now have the pair of equivalent formulae for TFP growth (2.14) and (2.15).
The aggregate TFP growth in the economyis represented as a combination of
the sectoral productivitygrowths. The sectoral rates of TFP growth are aggregated
to the level of macro-economy, using the value shares of sectoral gross outputs in the16 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
net output of the economyas the weights (the Domar decomposition), which leads
to the expression for TFP growth in the economy. (See chapter 3 for more detail.)
Formula (2.15) presents the so-called direct measure of sectoral TFP growth and
does not take into account the fact that the intermediate inputs are produced bythe
system. However, competitive equilibrium being assumed, the prices of outputs and
inputs are linked bythe relationship pj =
￿
ipiaij + wbj, i,j =1 ,2,...,n, so that
changes in prices of intermediates result in TFP changes. After accounting for this,
one can obtain the expression for ‘eﬀective rates’ of TFP growth, which account for
indirect eﬀects as well.5 (See, e.g. Aulin-Ahmavaara, 1999).
Not onlyproduction of intermediate inputs can be taken into account; other
extensions treat capital input as a produced means of production (Peterson, 1979,
Wolﬀ, 1985), or treat both labor and capital as produced bythe economy(Aulin-
Ahmavaara, 1999).
2.2.4 DEA and Malmquist index approach
In this section I discuss an approach to the measurement of TFP growth that is
mostlyused in the operations research and management science literature: Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
DEA deals with the problem of multiple inputs or outputs diﬀerently. It con-
structs a production frontier and computes the ‘distance’ between the observation
and the frontier. Total factor productivitygrowth is expressed in terms of changes
of the distances. Below I will introduce the main concepts and deﬁnitions that are
necessaryto relate this approach to the preceding ones, leaving a more extended
discussion of DEA and Malmquist indices to chapter 4.
Following F¨ are et al. (1996), we deﬁne the output set at time t as Pt(x)={y : x
can produce y}, where x and y are vectors of inputs and outputs as before. We
assume sets Pt(x) to be closed, bounded, convex, and satisfystrong disposabilityof
inputs and constant returns to scale.
The production technologyis represented bythe output distance function, which
is deﬁned for anypair of vectors of inputs and outputs ( x,y) and time t as
D
t
o(x,y) = inf{θ : y/θ ∈ P
t(x)} (2.16)
5Wolﬀ (1985) distinguishes the value share eﬀect and inter-industry eﬀect, along with the sec-
toral technical change eﬀect.2.2. Approaches to measuring TFP growth 17
The output distance function measures the maximum possible proportional expan-
sion of all outputs given the inputs.6
The Malmquist productivityindex can be deﬁned as a ratio of two distance func-
tions, as suggested byCaves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), or as the geometric
mean of two CCD-type7 Malmquist indices. The latter was proposed byF¨are et al.
(1989).
In the present section we applythe latter deﬁnition, that is introduce the formula
for the Malmquist index as follows8
Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t)=
￿￿
Dt
o(xt+1,y t+1)
Dt
o(xt,y t)
￿￿
Dt+1
o (xt+1,y t+1)
Dt+1
o (xt,y t)
￿￿1/2
. (2.17)
Values of Mo in excess of one indicate an improvement of TFP, values less than one
mean a decrease. The corresponding value of TFP growth is represented as
￿ T
M =l nMo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t). (2.18)
As we can see the deﬁnition of Malmquist indices uses information about distances
to the production frontiers. The construction of the frontier at each time requires
knowledge of data on all ‘production units’ (economies, in our case) that belong to
the reference set. Therefore, to applythe formula (2.17), it is not enough to know
information about the ‘production unit’ in question. One should have data on inputs
and outputs for the whole reference set of economies as well. Complications of the
6To compute the distance for some observation (x,y)w eh a v et os o l v et h ef o l l o w i n gp r o b l e m
infθ,λ≥0 θ
s. t . −y/θ +Y Tλ ￿ 0
x − XTλ ￿ 0
in which X and Y are matrices composed of vector columns of inputs and outputs corresponding to
our sample of production units (economies). Alternatively we could use an input distance function,
which shows the maximum possible proportional contraction of all inputs still to be able to produce
the same amount of output. This would lead to the same measure of eﬃciency, because input and
output distance functions are equivalent under the assumption of constant returns to scale (see
F¨ are and Grosskopf, 1996).
7CCD stands for Caves, Christensen and Dievert (1982).
8This is analogous to the Fisher index, which is the geometric average of the Laspeyres and
Paasche indices.18 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
reconciliation of the data for international comparison explains whythe Malmquist
indices are not verypopular among the macroeconomists. Just a few studies applied
them so far for evaluating aggregate productivitychanges (e.g., F¨are et al., 1994,
Taskin and Zaim, 1997).
However, Malmquist indices have a number of desirable properties, most impor-
tant of which is the independence of behavioral assumptions such as proﬁt maxi-
mization or cost minimization.
Notice that while the T¨ ornqvist and Fisher indices are deﬁned in terms of values,
the Malmquist indices use onlyprimaryinformation on inputs and outputs and do
not require input prices or output prices in their computation9. The explicit price
information is replaced byimplicit (’shadow’) price information, der ived from the
shape of the frontier. (See Coelli and Psarada Rao, 2001.)
Another, though related, attractive feature of Malmquist productivityindices is
that theycan be decomposed into economicallymeaningful sources of TFP growth:
technical change (or shifts of the production frontier) and eﬃciencychange ( move-
ments relative to the production frontier). I will elaborate on this decomposition in
chapter 4 of the thesis.
2.3 Relations between DEA, IO and index number
approaches
After reviewing the approaches to TFP growth measurement in the previous section,
we proceed with the analysis of the relationships among the diﬀerent measures.
First, in section 2.3.1 we establish the relation between the conventional productivity
indices of TFP growth and the Malmquist index and demonstrate that under certain
conditions the former are equivalent to the technical change component of the latter.
Then in section (2.3.2) we focus on the relation between the measures used byInput-
Output Analysis and DEA.
9Although in theory the Malmquist indices work with physical inputs and outputs, some infor-
mation on prices can still be necessary in practice. For example, to use capital as input, one have
to be able to measure capital. Then observed prices are needed to aggregate over diﬀerent capital
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2.3.1 Link between the Residual and the Malmquist index
Notice that the assumption of optimizing behavior underlying the T¨ ornqvist and
Fisher indices implies that theymeasure pure technical change and do not account
for production ineﬃciencies. On the contrary, the Malmquist index does not require
this behavioral assumption and incorporates ineﬃciencyin the analy sis. In fact,
technical change as deﬁned bySolow, which is measured bythe conventional indices
(those considered in section 2.2.2) and identiﬁed with shifts of the production fron-
tier, corresponds to the technical change component of the Malmquist index. The
following example illustrates this point.
Example 2.1 Let us consider the case of one output and neutral technical changes.
In this case the technology can be represented by a production function of the form
y
t = A(t)F(x
t) (2.19)
and the Solow Residual is equivalent to ￿ A, which in the discrete case is expressed as
SR =l nA(t +1 )− ln A(t)=l n
A(t +1 )
A(t)
. (2.20)
It can be shown that in this special case the technical change component of the
Malmquist index is equivalent to (2.20).10 In particular, notice that for this produc-
tion function the output distance function at t is as follows
D
t
o(x,y)=m i n {θ : y/θ ≤ A(t)F(x)} =
= min{θ : y/A(t)F(x) ≤ θ} =
y
A(t)F(x)
.
Substituting this into the formula for the Malmquist index yields
Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t)=
yt+1
F(xt+1)
F(xt)
yt . (2.21)
Since we focus on the technical change component, we can restrict ourselves to the
case of no ineﬃciency, in which output and input are related by (2.19) in each
time t. By substituting (2.19) in the last formula, we obtain the expression for the
Malmquist index as follows
Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t)=
A(t +1 )
A(t)
, (2.22)
which is equivalent to the Solow measure of technical change (2.20) above.
10F¨ are et al. (1994) provides a similar illustration, but their analysis is limited to the case of a
Cobb-Douglas production function.20 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
The observation demonstrated in the above example holds in a more general
case of nonneutral technical changes. In this respect two important results have
been established in the literature.
First, Caves et al. (1982) have shown that the Malmquist index (2.17) becomes
aT ¨ ornqvist productivityindex (2.11) provided that the distance functions are of
translog form with identical second order coeﬃcients, and that the prices are those
supporting cost minimization and proﬁt maximization.
Second, F¨ are and Grosskopf (1992) proved that under the assumption of max-
imizing behavior the Malmquist index (2.17) is approximatelyequal to the Fisher
productivityindex (2.12).
These two general results provide a link between the conventional T¨ ornqvist and
Fisher productivityindices and the Malmquist index, and formulate the conditions
for their equivalence. In both cases the assumption of the optimizing behavior of
producers plays the crucial role. Under this assumption all three indices (T¨ ornqvist,
Fisher and Malmquist) represent shifts of the production frontier - or ‘technical
change’ as deﬁned bySolow - leading to the interpretation of the technical change
component of the Malmquist index as Solow residual.
2.3.2 Synthesis of Input-Output Analysis and DEA
As we have discussed above, the ‘eﬀective rates’ constructed within the neoclassical
Input-Output framework allow us to take into consideration the changes of produc-
tivitywhich are due to changes of relative prices. The optimizing behavior being
assumed, the prices used in computation are observable prices.
Ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) augment the neoclassical measure of TFP growth
as follows. Theyapplythe traditional formula of the neoclassical growth accounting,
but use the shadow prices obtained from the linear program instead of the observable
ones. The obtained measure of TFP is based on fundamentals of the economy,
similarlyto the Malmquist indices.
The underlying linear program is as follows. Given a Leontief technology, Leon-
tief preferences and endowments, the economyexpands the ﬁnal-demand vector by
adjusting the trade pattern and reallocating inputs among the sectors. The op-
timal outcome represents the potential that a multi-sectoral open economycould2.4. Conclusion 21
achieve under free trade bychanging the allocation of production factors across
sectors within the economy. This is in contrast to DEA, where the potential for
improvement is determined bycross-sectional or intertemporal benchmarking.
The new measure of TFP growth encompasses not onlythe technical change ef-
fect (or Solow Residual), but also the eﬃciencychange and terms-of-trade eﬀects. In
case of a closed economythe terms-of-trade eﬀect disappears, and the decomposition
will reduce to the sum of technical change and eﬃciencychange as before.
There is, however, an important diﬀerence between the models. In DEA the
available technologyis determined bythe so-called best practice that is constructed
bycombining the technologies of the economies in the sample. Consequently , ineﬃ-
ciencyis ‘technical ineﬃciency ’ measured relativelyto that best practice. While in
the latter model, the available production technologyis assumed to be represented
bythe observed technical coeﬃcients. Ineﬃciencystems from the suboptimal alloca-
tion of production within the system, or from wasting the resources (not employing
the endowed primaryinputs in production). 11
Ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) considered a model of a small open economy. Thus
the world prices that deﬁned ‘the technology’ according to which country could
export and import goods were exogenous in the model. I will elaborate on this
model in chapter 3, in which I consider three large economies trading among each
other. The model considered in chapter 3 completelyendogenizes prices.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we described several approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
rates. We started with the original approach bySolow (1957) and then considered
the Index-Number approach, as well as approaches adopted in Input-Output and
DEA literature.
We identiﬁed the diﬀerences and similarities among diﬀerent methods and sum-
marized the main results from the literature formulating the conditions under which
the diﬀerent methods mayprovide equivalent (or close) measures for TFP growth.
In particular, the condition of optimizing behavior appears to be crucial in this
11Strictly speaking, DEA can incorporate other types of ineﬃciencies as well (for example, non-
radial DEA models can account for the presence of a slack). However, we will not discuss those
in this particular application, since the standard Malmquist indices based on DEA with constant
returns to scale that are typically used for the TFP measurement operate with technical ineﬃciency.22 2. Review of approaches to the measurement of TFP growth
respect.
The assumption of the optimizing behavior, which lends theoretical support to
the conventional T¨ ornqvist or Fisher indices, while not required in the case of
Malmquist indices, explains the main conceptual diﬀerence between the conven-
tional and the Malmquist indices. This allows the Malmquist indices to incorporate
the eﬀect of eﬃciencychange which is neglected bythe other indices.
Input-Output framework provides indices of technical changes conceptuallyclose
to the conventional Solow Residual. However, theycan be augmented to factor
in both eﬃciencychange and the terms-of-trade eﬀect. This can be done if the
observable prices are replaced byshadow prices obtained from the optimization
problem. Although, similarlyto DEA, the eﬃciencyis interpreted as the potential
for boosting the production to reach the production possibilityfrontier, there is an
important diﬀerence in the meaning of the frontier in the two models. In DEA the
potential is determined bythe observable best practice (possiblyachieved bythe
other market participants), while in the augmented input-output model it comes
from improving allocations of production factors within a multi-sectoral economy.Chapter 3
General Equilibrium Analysis of
International TFP Growth Rates
This chapter1 elaborates on the model byten Raa and Mohnen (2002) discussed in
section 2.3.2.
I consider a general equilibrium model of three large economies - the US, Japan
and Europe - linked byinternational trade. The model is based on the fundamentals
of the economies and employs only data on input-output ﬂows, factor inputs across
sectors, consumption, trade patterns and endowments. Prices are endogenous in the
model. Theyare obtained as shadow prices from the model’s linear program and
then used to measure TFP growth.
Similarlyto the paper byten Raa and Mohnen, TFP growth is evaluated at
shadow prices and decomposed into technical change, eﬃciencychange and the
terms-of-trade eﬀect. The important distinction, however, lies in the treatment of
world prices. In ten Raa and Mohnen (2002), which considers a small open economy,
onlyinternal prices were determined endogenously , while international prices were
exogenous. In mysetting, trade between large economies is considered, world prices
become endogenous as well.
The model is applied to analyze the total factor productivity (TFP) performance
in the US, Japan and Europe between 1985 and 1990. The new technical change
measure will be shown to be highlycorrelated with the conventional Solow residual,
lending support to the latter measure of technical change.
1This chapter is based on Shestalova (2001).
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3.1 Introduction
The standard of living of the citizens in a national economymayrise for three
reasons. First, and foremost, technical progress allows the production of more by
less. Secondly, an increase of production eﬃciency enhances a better use of the
available resources. Thirdly , an open economymaybeneﬁt from changes in the
terms of trade.
The ﬁrst source of growth, technical progress, is measured bythe well-known
Solow residual. The second is eﬃciencychange. It shows how much an economycan
gain bysimplya better allocation of scarce resources across sectors and adjusting
its patterns of production and trade accordingly. Some changes in the production
pattern mayappear to be economic from a resource saving point of view and, there-
fore, boost productivity. For example, the shift towards electronics not only adds
more weight to that sector in the Solow residual, but also facilitates a more eﬃcient
use of resource inputs.
Changes in the terms of trade are known to be equivalent to technical progress in
theory. In practice, however, few studies ascribe productivitygrowth to this trade
component. Moreover, in a general equilibrium framework encompassing the entire
economic system, terms-of-trade changes ought to be reduced to technology and
preference shifts, possiblyin a partner economy .
In this chapter I measure total factor productivity(TFP) growth in three na-
tional economies - namelyUSA, Japan and Europe - linked bytrade. TFP growth
comprises three terms: Solow residual, eﬃciencychange and terms-of-trade eﬀect,
following ten Raa and Mohnen (2002). In their analysis the terms of trade are ex-
ogenous, which is plausible for a small open economy. Since here we are interested
in the TFP growth of the main world players it is more appropriate to consider
the terms-of-trade eﬀect as endogenous, driven bytechnologyand preference shifts.
Roughlyspeaking, the terms-of-trade eﬀect favors TFP growth of a national econ-
omyif the imports become cheaper relative to exports. A clean measurement of
technologyand preference-shift eﬀects bymeans of national TFP growth rates re-
quires that inputs and outputs are valuated competitively, for the same reason as
exposed bySolow (1957) for a national macro-economy . As observed economies are
not perfectlycompetit ive, market prices cannot be used at face value and, therefore,
are replaced byendogenous shadow prices to evaluate the TFP growth.
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growth considered in this chapter is similar to that for the conventional measure
of TFP growth. However, the former is evaluated at the optimal output levels and
shadow prices, while the latter employs the observable prices and output levels.
It can be demonstrated that the conventional measure of TFP growth can be
represented as a weighted sum of changes in technical coeﬃcients (see, e.g., Wolﬀ,
1994). The Solow residual component preciselycorresponds to this representation
and captures the eﬀect of technological changes. It measures the growth of output
not attributed to the growth of inputs. Thus, this component accounts for the
growth of quantityproduced, rather than the changes in the value assigned to these
units. If an economyis not divided into sectors, then there are no changes in the
real value of a unit of output, the real price does not change and the growth of
the quantityproduced is the same as the growth of its real value. H owever, if the
economycomprises more sectors, then the growth in terms of the number of units
no longer coincides with the growth in terms of value assigned to them. Changes in
relative prices cause changes in the real value of a unit of one commodityrelat ively
to that of others and, therefore, changes in the productivityof factors producing it.
Starting with the neoclassical deﬁnition of TFP as the diﬀerence between the
growths of real output and input, and accounting for the eﬀect of relative price
changes properly, it will be shown here that the Solow residual is augmented with
two additional terms: the eﬃciencychange and the terms-of-trade eﬀect. The eﬃ-
ciencychange r eveals the change in the gap between the optimal outcome (resulting
from the general equilibrium model) and the outcome actuallyachi eved, while the
terms-of-trade eﬀect is ascribed to changes in terms of trade. For a closed economy
changes in relative prices can be ascribed to changes in the real fundamentals of
the economy2, but for an open economychanges in domestic relative prices may
result from changes in the fundamentals of the other economies as well. Interna-
tional trade is the transmitting mechanism, and world prices must be determined
to capture these eﬀects.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I introduce a model of a system of economies
linked byinternational trade in section 3.2. The model allows me to determine
the competitive levels of production and ﬁnal demand together with the supporting
(shadow) prices, which will be used to compute TFP growth. (See ten Raa and
2This is similar to the idea explored by Aulin-Ahmavaara (1999), who shows that fully eﬀec-
tive rates of productivity growth can be based solely on the technological characteristics of the
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Mohnen, 1998, for the connection between competition and optimization.) Section
3.3 presents a formula for the decomposition of TFP growth. TFP growth is decom-
posed into three eﬀects. The ﬁrst corresponds to the conventional Solow residual
and reﬂects the growth due to technological changes. The second is associated with
changes in eﬃciency. And the last term - the terms-of-trade eﬀect - stems from
changes in relative prices. Since world relative prices as well as optimal trade pat-
terns are endogenous in the model, the terms-of-trade eﬀect will be fullyascribed to
changes in the structures of the economies. Section 3.4 describes the data used to es-
timate the model and section 3.5 presents the results. The main empirical ﬁndings
are as follows. First, Solow residuals computed using shadow prices and optimal
production levels are highlycorrelated with those based on the observed prices and
output levels. This result lends support to the standard practice of the measurement
of Solow residual. Second, I have found that Solow residuals for Europe and the
US were lower than those for Japan. In spite of a strong negative terms-of-trade
eﬀect, Japan was leading in TFP growth over the period. Section 3.6 summarizes
the conclusions.
3.2 The Model
A free trade model of the ‘world economy’ is applied to ﬁnd the optimal production
and trade patterns, as well as the supporting shadow prices of commodities and
factors of production. The ‘world’ in this model consists of three large economies
and ‘the rest of the world’. The trade with the rest of the world is pegged at
the observed level; consequently, the model describes interactions among the large
economies only. World prices corresponding to the optimal activity levels in the
considered economies are determined byinternational trade.
A model of this type has already been used by ten Raa and Mohnen (2001) in
their paper on the location of comparative advantages between Canada and Europe.
The present chapter extends their model to ﬁnd the optimal levels of production
and the supporting shadow prices for the case of three big economies, namelythe
United States, Japan and Europe3, which together cover a signiﬁcant share of the
3The data for Europe were constructed by aggregation of the data for three European economies:
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world trade4. I have chosen to aggregate the three European countries into one
economyto emphasize the tendencyin Europe towards union, leading to closing the
existing technological gaps. The fact that trade among three European countries is
redeﬁned as intra-trade does not change net export from Europe to anyof the other
economies.
The model maximizes the level of the world ﬁnal demand subject to commodity
and factor inputs constraints, and given the proportions of the domestic ﬁnal demand
vector in each economy.
Tradable goods are assumed not to be diﬀerentiated with respect to a country-
producer. The technologyof each economy j5 is described bycapital and l abor input
coeﬃcients kj, lj (n-dimensional row vectors) and the commodityinput coeﬃcient
matrix Aj
6 (an n-dimensional square matrix), where n is the number of diﬀerent
commodities, which is the same as the number of sectors. Capital and labor are
mobile across sectors within each economy, but immobile across the economies7.
The gross output vector of economy j is denoted by xj (an n-dimensional column
vector). The net output of economy j can be expressed as (I −Aj)xj.
Following ten Raa and Mohnen (2001), we assume that consumers have pref-
erences of the Leontief type. This implies that the preferences of consumers in
economy j can be described bythe vector of domestic ﬁnal demand of this economy ,
4The relative sizes of the considered countries in terms of GDP are following: 51% (the US),
21% (Japan), 11% (West Germany), 9% (France) and 8% (the UK). In 1985 the industrialized
countries covered about 66% of the total world export, as well as about 68% of the total import
(Source: GATT International Trade 1986/87). The ﬁve considered countries - the US, Japan,
Germany, the UK and France - are the ﬁve largest exporters and importers in the world, therefore,
their trade constitutes the bulk of these volumes.
5Indices 1,2,3 are used for the US, Japan, Europe, respectively.
6To deﬁne the corresponding technical coeﬃcients the commodity technology model is used.
The model assumes that any industry producing a commodity produces it by the same technology,
which leads to the expression for the matrix of technical coeﬃcients A = U(V T)−1,w h e r eU,V are
correspondingly ” use”and ” make”matrixes. In the traditional one-matrix input-output framework
V is assumed to be a diagonal matrix with gross outputs of each sector on the diagonal. Then
labor and capital coeﬃcients for each industry are expressed as a ratio of the corresponding factor
of production employment in the industry to gross output produced by the industry.
7The case of factor mobility across economies can be incorporated by pooling the respective
constraints. The case of no factor input mobility across sectors can be incorporated by introducing
separate constraints for each sector. The case of diﬀerentiated labor (or capital) can be earsily
incorporated by introducing constraints on each type of labor (capital).28 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
which is denoted by fj (j =1 ,2,3). To maximize utilityeach economyexpands its
ﬁnal demand vector. Final demand includes both consumption and gross invest-
ment. The inclusion of investment in the objective function allows us to account
for the whole stream of future consumption. Weitzman (1976) demonstrated that
for competitive economies domestic ﬁnal demand measures the present discounted
value of future consumption.
The expansion factors for ﬁnal demands of the three economies are denoted by
c1, c2 and c3. We can scan the world production possibilityfrontier byputting
c1 = c,c2 = cγ2 and c3 = cγ3 and varying γ2 and γ3, the direction of expansion.
Consequently, the corresponding expanded ﬁnal demands are cf1,c γ 2f2 and cγ3f3.
Given weights (1,γ2,γ3) the weighted sum of ﬁnal demands of the three economies
becomes c(f1 + γ2f2 + γ3f3). Here c can be interpreted as the expansion factor for
the weighted sum of ﬁnal demands of the three economies.
Each tradable commoditycan be consumed as a ﬁnal good, used in production
as an intermediate good or exported. That is xj ￿ Ajxj+cγjfj+
￿
zj
0
￿
,j=1 ,2,3.
Here
￿
zj
0
￿
denotes total net export from country j. The commodities are numbered
in such a waythat nontradable commodities follow tradable commodities. Vector
zj corresponds to tradable commodities. Components of the net export vector that
correspond to the nontradable commodities are set to zero.
The vector of total net exports of the three countries with the rest of the world
is assumed to be ﬁxed at the observed level. Since the sum of total net exports
of the three economies should be at least equal to the total net export from those
countries to the rest of the world, we obtain
3 ￿
j=1
zj ￿
3 ￿
j=1
z
0
j,
where z0
j corresponds to the observed level of total net export from country j.
The linear program is as follows:3.2. The Model 29
max
xj,zj,c
ce
T
3 ￿
j=1
γjfj (3.1)
subject to:
material balance constraint:
(I − Aj)xj ￿ cγjfj +
￿
zj
0
￿
,j =1 ,2,3 (3.2)
trade with the rest of the world:
3 ￿
j=1
zj ￿
3 ￿
j=1
z
0
j (3.3)
factor inputs:
kjxj ￿ Kj,l jxj ￿ Lj,j =1 ,2,3 (3.4)
non-negativity:
xj ￿ 0,j =1 ,2,3. (3.5)
Here γ1 has been put to one, eT is a unit row vector, T denotes transpose, scalar
Kj is the capital stock in country j and scalar Lj is the labor force in country j.
Inequalities (3.2) and (3.3) implythat for anytradable commodity , t,w eh a v ea
worldwide constraint
3 ￿
j=1
￿
n ￿
s=1
(Its −Ats,j)
￿
xs,j ￿
3 ￿
j=1
cγjft,j +
3 ￿
j=1
z
0
t,j
where the subindexes t, s and ts relate to the corresponding components of vectors
and matrices. That is, total net output of the three economies should not be less,
than the sum of the three economies’ total ﬁnal demand and the observed total
export from the system to the rest of the world. For nontradable commodities the30 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
corresponding components of vector
￿
zj
0
￿
, j =1 ,2,3 are equal to zero, and con-
dition (3.2) implies that each country’s ﬁnal demand for a nontradable commodity,
t, cannot exceed the net output of this commodity, or:
￿
n ￿
s=1
(Its − Ats,j)
￿
xs,j ￿ cγjft,j,j =1 ,2,3.
The corresponding dual problem is:
min
ptrad,pj,rj,wj
p
T
trad
3 ￿
j=1
z
0
j +
3 ￿
j=1
rjKj +
3 ￿
j=1
wjLj (3.6)
subject to:
−p
T
j (I − Aj)+rjkj + wjlj − σj =0 ,j =1 ,2,3 (3.7)
ptrad,j = ptrad, j =1 ,2,3 (3.8)
3 ￿
j=1
p
T
j γjfj = e
T
3 ￿
j=1
γjfj (3.9)
ptrad ￿ 0,p j ￿ 0,w j ￿ 0,r j ￿ 0,σ j ￿ 0,j =1 ,2,3, (3.10)
where rj, wj are rent and wage rate in country j, σj are slacks. Vector pj = ￿
ptrad,j
pnontrad,j
￿
is a vector of prices in country j. The ﬁrst block of components, ptrad,j,
corresponds to the tradable commodities and these prices are equalized across coun-
tries according to (3.8). Notice that this model does not account for transportation
cost, nor tariﬀs.3.2. The Model 31
The linear program (3.1) - (3.5) basicallymaximizes the expansion factor c.
However, in the objective function the expansion factor c is multiplied bya constant
(the value of a weighted sum of ﬁnal demands). The presence of this constant does
not change relative shadow prices of goods and factors, but determines the natural
normalization rule for them: the value of the weighted ﬁnal demand at shadow prices
has to be the same as at observable prices. This rule is expressed bycondition (3.9)
in the dual problem.
A commoditywill be produced bya countryif and onlyif the cost of its produc-
tion does not exceed its price. Therefore, in active sectors the slacks are equal
to zero. This reﬂects the phenomenon of complementaryslackness, σjxj =0 .
(See, e.g., ten Raa, 1995.) The complementaryslackness condition also gives us
rjkjxj = rjKj,w jljxj = wjLj, j =1 ,2,3.
Multiplying (3.7) by xj, we obtain that for anycountry j
−p
T
j (I − Aj)xj + rjkjxj + wjljxj − σjxj =0 .
The last expression implies the well-known macroeconomic identityof the national
product and national income:
p
T
j (I − Aj)xj = rjKj + wjLj. (3.11)
The condition on net export from the system, (3.3), is binding. Consequently, trade
surplus of the system vis-a-vis the rest of the world satisﬁes:
p
T
trad
3 ￿
j=1
zj = p
T
trad
3 ￿
j=1
z
0
j.
If we denote the total trade surplus of country j at the optimal point as Sj,
Sj = p
T
tradzj,
and the trade surplus of country j corresponding to the observable trade pattern as
S0
j,
S
0
j = p
T
tradz
0
j,
we can express the above condition on total trade with the rest of the world as a
condition on the sum of the countries’ surpluses in the international trade
S1 + S2 + S3 = S
0
1 + S
0
2 + S
0
3. (3.12)32 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
The solution of the dual program gives us shadow prices and optimal levels of output
in each sector for each economyfor the given set of weights γ2 and γ3.T h u s , w e
have ﬁrst to deﬁne the weights. We obtain them from the following condition on
surpluses of countries in international trade:
S1 = S
0
1,S 2 = S
0
2,S 3 = S
0
3. (3.13)
These conditions playthe role of a budget constraint on international trade: the
obtained equilibrium allocation must preserve the debt positions. At the equilibrium
price vector of tradable commodities, ptrad, country j can trade the initial quantity
z0
j for at least S0
j, but it adjusts its trade, preserving its debt position. By(3.12),
anytwo of the equations (3.13) implies the third one, so theydetermine the two
weights, γ2 and γ3, which characterize the optimal welfare distribution among the
three economies under free trade. Thus, linear program (3.1) - (3.5) together with
condition (3.13) deﬁnes an equilibrium level of production and consumption for the
three economies.
3.3 The deﬁnition of TFP growth
The solution of the above problem provides the optimal allocation of production
for a given year, and determines how much the ﬁnal consumption can be expanded.
Hence, the general equilibrium model gives us an economic criterion to deﬁne the
maximum expansion and the optimal point.
Similarlyto Data E nvelopment Analysis, we interpret the inverse of the expan-
sion factor of an economyas its eﬃciencyand saythat ‘the eﬃciencyof economy
j’i s( cγj)−1. The optimal point represents the state that is feasible to reach under
the given assumptions on current technologyand preferences. Thus, in accordance
with the DEA terminology, we refer to this point as ‘the reference point on the fron-
tier’. Consequently, changes of the expansion factor over time are called eﬃciency
changes, while shifts of the optimal point - technical changes. The contribution of
these two sources of TFP growth has been acknowledged byDEA literature.
International trade provides another source of TFP growth (see Diewert and
Morrison, 1986, ten Raa and Mohnen, 2002). A general equilibrium framework,
taking into account international trade, allows us to incorporate this eﬀect.
Following ten Raa and Mohnen (2002), we look at the net import to the economy
as an additional input, which together with the traditional inputs - capital and labor3.3. The deﬁnition of TFP growth 33
- contribute to the growth of ﬁnal demand in the economy.
As in Solow (1957) we deﬁne the TFP growth as the growth of overall ﬁnal
demand minus the growth of aggregate inputs, however, we use the shadow prices
to ﬁnd the value shares. For anycountry j we obtain
￿ TFPj =
pT
•
fj
pTfj
−
wj
•
Lj + rj
•
Kj − pT
trad
•
zo
j
wjLj + rjKj − pT
tradzo
j
, (3.14)
in which a dot denotes the time derivative d
dt. The subscript j will be dropped in
the further derivations to shorten the notation.
The above formula can be rearranged as
￿ TFP =
cγpT
•
f
cγpTf
−
w
•
L + r
•
K − pT
trad
•
zo
wL + rK − pT
tradzo =
=
pT(cγf)• − (cγ)•pTf
cγpTf
−
w
•
L + r
•
K −pT
trad
•
zo
cγpTf
=
= −
(cγ)•
cγ
+
pT
￿
cγf +
￿
z
0
￿￿•
− w
•
L − r
•
K + pT
trad(zo −z)•
cγpTf
=
(3.2)
= −
(cγ)•
cγ
+
pT ([I −A]x))• − r(kx)• − w(lx)•
cγpTf
+
pT
trad(zo − z)•
cγpTf
=
(3.13)(3.11)
= −
(cγ)•
cγ
−
(pT
•
A + r
•
k + w
•
l)x
cγpTf
+
•
p
T
trad(z −zo)
cγpTf
. (3.15)
To derive the above expression we used material balances (3.2), national accounting
identities (3.11), and conditions on surpluses (3.13).
Equation (3.15) features three terms. The ﬁrst term reﬂects eﬃciency change.
Movements of the economytowards the frontier contribute to TFP growth, while
outward movements bring about a TFP decline. Hence, TFP is growing when the
expansion factor declines.34 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
The second term is technical change. As we see it describes the eﬀect of a
reduction in technical coeﬃcients for intermediates, capital and labor inputs. In
other words, it is the Solow residual evaluated at shadow prices and the optimal gross
output levels. Prices enter this term as weights and show the relative importance of
technological changes in diﬀerent sectors.
Even if all technical coeﬃcients and ﬁnal demand vector in the countryremain
the same, TFP maystill change because of changes in terms of trade, which occur
due to shifts in technologyor ﬁnal demand in the other economies. These changes
are captured bythe last term.
The last term is called the terms-of-trade eﬀect, since it is caused bychanges
in the terms of trade. By(3.15), an increase of the price of a commodityexported
in excess of the initiallytraded quantityy ields TFP growth, whilst an increase of
the price of an imported commodityleads to a TFP decline. Although we preserve
the observed level of the total net export from the system, the terms-of-trade eﬀects
for the three economies do not sum up to zero, because of diﬀerent values of ﬁnal
demand in the denominators.
A similar decomposition of TFP growth has been performed in the paper by
ten Raa and Mohnen (2002). In their paper, the observable relative world prices
still enter the expression for the TFP growth, because there the case of a small open
economyis considered. In the present model the international prices are endogenous
(determined bythe linear program) and reﬂect the true marginal cost of production
of commodities (at the optimal levels of production and consumption). Therefore,
the TFP growth formula relies onlyon changes in the fundamentals of the economies,
namely, endowments, tastes and technologies.
Combining the material balance constraints, (3.2), the condition on trade sur-
pluses, (3.13), and the national account identities, (3.11), we obtain
p
Tcγf = −p
T
tradz
0 + rK + wL.
Diﬀerentiating this condition with respect to time, using (3.14), leads to the dual
expression for TFP growth, which imputes the growth of TFP to all factor inputs:
￿ TFP = −
(
•
cγ)
cγ
+
•
rK +
•
wL −
•
p
T
tradzo
wL + rK − pT
tradzo −
•
p
T
f
pTf
(3.16)
The dual approach to the measurement of TFP growth was ﬁrst suggested byJor-
genson and Griliches (1967), who showed that under constant returns to scale the3.4. Data description 35
direct deﬁnition of the TFP growth as a diﬀerence between the growth of quantity
of output and quantityof input is equivalent to its dual deﬁnition as a diﬀerence
between the growth of the price of input and the growth of the price of output, or
consequently, the growth of real price of input. Formula (3.16) here, however, devi-
ates from that byJorgenson and Griliches in three respects. First, it incorporates
eﬃciencychange - the ﬁrst term in (3.16). Second, it accounts for international
trade and considers net import to the economyas a factor input. Third, it uses
shadow prices instead of observable prices.
3.4 Data description
The present analysis is conducted for three economies, namely the US, Japan and
Europe, where the latter is an aggregation of France, West Germanyand the UK,
for the years 1985 and 1990. It uses input-output tables and data on labor and
capital stocks across sectors.
The fact that countries use not onlydiﬀerent commodityand industryclassi-
ﬁcations, but also diﬀerent methodologies of constructing data renders data from
national statistical oﬃces incomparable. Reconciliation is a verycomplicated process
requiring additional data at a lower level of aggregation, which is rarelyavailable.
The OECD Statistical Oﬃce has made eﬀorts to harmonize the national Input-
Output tables of ten OECD countries. The present studymakes use of two OECD
data bases, namelythe Input-Output Data Base (IODB) and the Industrial Struc-
ture Data Base (ISDB). The IODB (OECD, 1995) presents the Input-Output tables
at several years for ten countries and uses a common industrial classiﬁcation com-
prising 36 sectors. The ISDB contains data on the employment and capital stocks.
The classiﬁcation applied in ISDB is less broad (26 sectors, if we exclude subtotals),
but can be bridged with the classiﬁcation used in Input-Output tables. It has to
be admitted that the OECD data are still not perfectlyharmonized and subject to
some inconsistencies, which seem inevitable in the construction of an international
data set. However, it is the best alternative available, providing the most complete
dataset for the purpose of this research.
The original industrial classiﬁcation used in IODB distinguishes 35 sectors. Though
it is in the interest of this studyto have the number of sectors as large as possible,
a certain degree of aggregation was required. After the aggregation the number of
sectors has been reduced to 31. (For details, see Appendix.)36 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
The input-output tables are converted to constant prices in 1990 US dollars,
as follows. First, the tables for 19858 are expressed in constant 1990 prices using
the ratio of domestic production in constant 1990 prices to domestic production in
current 1985 prices in each sector as deﬂators. Secondly, the tables in constant 1990
prices are converted to constant 1990 dollars by1990 PPP’s. The data on GDP
across sectors in current and constant prices for this procedure as well as the PPPs
are taken from the ISDB (OECD, 1996). The deﬂators for observed international
prices are constructed as weighted averages of the deﬂators for the observed do-
mestic prices, with domestic ﬁnal demands taken as weights in accordance with the
normalization used for shadow prices.
Data on labor across sectors comes from ISDB (OECD, 1996) for all countries
except for Japan, of which the data is taken directlyfrom the Japan Statistical
Yearbook (1995)9. Labor is deﬁned as total employment including self-employment
and is measured bythe number of individuals. Data on labor force for the ﬁve
countries are taken from the Labor Force Statistics published byOECD (1995).
The labor force is given bythe number of p eople who potentiallycan work.
Data on capital stock byindustrycomes from ISDB. Capital stocks are estimated
bymeans of the perpetual inventorymodel. The estimation is based on the series of
gross ﬁxed capital formation and speciﬁc to each sector and countrylives and rates of
scrapping (see OECD, 1996 for more detail). For each industryemploy ed capital is
deﬁned as the capital stock of industry, corrected for capital utilization. The capital
utilization rates10 for 1985 and 1990 are taken from OECD Economic Outlook (1993)
8In fact the table for Germany and the UK presented by OECD are not for 1985 but for 1986 and
1984 correspondingly. It was assumed in this study that the input-output structure in Germany
(and the UK) did not change between 1985 and 1986 (and between 1984 and 1985 for the UK).
Consequently, the table for Europe was constructed as follows. The tables for Germany (1986)
and the UK (1984) were ﬁrst expressed in constant prices and then added up with the data for
France (1985) also expressed in constant prices. The input-output coeﬃcients of the aggregate are
weighted sums of the input-output coeﬃcients of each country, the weights being the gross output
shares. The OECD tables of 1985 and 1990 for the US are extrapolations of the benchmark table
for 1982 using 1977 weights. Updating these tables with more recent information would improve
the results.
9There were inconsistencies in the data on employment for Japan in ISDB (1996).
10We had at our disposal only the average capital utilization rates data for manufacturing.
Data on capacity utilization corresponding to agriculture, mining and services were not available.
Consequently capacity utilization rates for all industries are assumed to be equal to the average
observed for manufacturing.3.4. Data description 37
and The Statistical Abstract of the US (US, Department of Commerce, 1995).
Capital and labor coeﬃcients are constructed as ratios of capital (or labor) em-
ploy ed in the industryto the gross output produced bythe industry . For a few
sectors with missing values for labor or capital11, input coeﬃcients are assumed to
be equal to the average numbers observed for those sectors in the other countries.
Observed wage and rent shares, which are used for the computation of Solow
residuals at the observed prices and output levels, are constructed as follows. Wage
shares are obtained from Input-Output tables for all countries except for the US,
whose IO Tables do not provide data on compensation of employees. For the US
wage shares are taken from the ISDB (OECD, 1996). Rent shares are constructed
residuallyas a diﬀerence between value added and wage share.
A bridge table, which links the classiﬁcation used in the IODB to the classiﬁ-
cation from ISDB is presented in the Appendix. The ISDB data is slightlymore
aggregated: some ISDB sectors encompass several IODB sectors. In such cases cap-
ital and labor coeﬃcients for each of these IODB sectors are assumed to be equal
and computed as a ratio of the capital (or labor) employed in the ISDB sector to
the sum of gross outputs produced bythe corresponding IODB sectors.
Commodities produced bysectors ‘23 Construction’ and ‘31 Non-market activ-
ities’ are considered as nontradable, since the input-output tables for all countries
except for Germanyreported zero values of export and import for these sectors.
All necessarydata for the research have been limited to technical coeﬃcients,
endowments of labor and capital and proportions of ﬁnal demands across sectors.
The numerous problems with this kind of international data (e.g., the diﬀerent treat-
ment of the secondaryproducts bynational input-output tables, incomparabilityof
capital utilization rate construction, missing values and absence of cross-sector data
on real exchange rate between countries) suggest that the empirical results should
be handled with care.
11Missing values on capital are encountered in the following sectors: ‘5 Wood and wood products’
(for the US and UK), ‘11 and 12 Basic metal industries’ (the UK), ‘13 Fabricated metal products’
(the UK), ‘20 Professional goods’ (the UK), ‘21 Other manufacturing industries’ (France), ‘25
Restaurants and hotels’ (the US and Japan). Data on labor is missing for sector ‘25 Restaurants
and hotels’ for Germany.38 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
3.5 Results of the Total Factor Productivity growth
estimation
We start with the analysis of the technical change eﬀect, the ﬁrst component in
equation (3.15). It can be shown that this component can be decomposed further
into sectoral technical change eﬀects as follows:
SR =
￿
t ptxtSRt
cγpTf
, (3.17)
where t stands for sectors, and SRt denotes the Solow residual in sector t. The last
representation shows contributions of each sector t to the total factor productivity
growth of the country. The weights used in (3.17) do not sum up to one (the Domar
decomposition).
The contribution of sector t to the Solow residual of country j is expressed as
SRt,j =
1
pt,j
￿
−
￿
s
ps,j
.
Ast,j − wj
.
lt,j − rj
.
kt,j
￿
= (3.18)
= −
￿
s
ps,jAst,j
pt,j
￿ Ast,j −
wjlt,j
pt,j
￿ lt,j −
rjkt,j
pt,j
￿ kt,j.
Here a hat denotes the growth rate and subindexes s and t are used for sectors (s =
1,2,...,n;t =1 ,2,...,n). For example, lt,j denotes component t of vector lj. Since
the formula above is given for inﬁnitesimal changes, while the computations have to
be done for ﬁnite changes, we approximate it bythe average of two expressions: one
with 1985-year weights and one with 1990-year weights. (See e.g. Dietzenbacher
and Los, 1998, for discussion of the index number problem.)
The results on sectoral Solow residual are shown in Table 3.1. The ﬁrst three
columns present the Solow residuals of the three economies computed at the observed
level of production and using observed prices on commodities and factor inputs.
The next three columns correspond to those at the optimum level of production and
shadow prices. The sectoral Solow residuals based on observed output and price
data are found to be highlycorrelated with those obtained at the optimum levels of
output and using shadow prices. In fact, the correlation coeﬃcients are 0.96 for the
US, 0.94 for Japan and 0.92 for Europe.3.5. Results of the Total Factor Productivity growth estimation 39
Table 3.1: Annual Solow residuals (1985-1990)
Industry
SR at observed prices and
levels of production
(in %)
SR at shadow prices and
optimal levels of production
(in %)
US Japan Europe US Japan Europe
1. Agr., hunting, forestry, fishing 0.84 1.24 2.27 -0.15 3.89 3.19
2. Mining and quarrying 3.20 0.33 1.99 4.61 2.96 4.85
3. Food, beverages, tobacco -1.03 -1.65 -0.48 -0.97 -1.80 0.01
4. Textiles, wear. apparel, leather 2.32 0.57 0.10 2.02 0.87 1.07
5. Wood and prod., incl. furniture 3.17 2.36 0.06 3.26 2.66 0.71
6. Paper and prod., printing, publ. -0.65 0.88 -0.09 -0.38 1.33 0.83
7. Ind. chemic., Drugs, medicines 0.43 -0.16 -0.41 0.74 -0.98 -0.84
8. Petroleum and coal -7.31 1.93 -1.93 -7.31 2.32 -3.05
9. Rubber and plastic products 0.36 -0.54 -0.52 0.56 0.56 -0.75
10. Non-metallic mineral products 1.93 0.08 0.85 2.69 0.52 1.82
11. Iron and steel -1.86 0.25 -0.82 -2.37 0.36 -0.59
12. Non-ferrous metals -1.85 0.04 -1.89 -0.50 0.16 -2.08
13. Metal products -0.60 4.10 1.70 -0.34 5.47 3.33
14. Non-electrical machinery 1.82 2.47 -0.11 2.88 3.58 -0.11
15. Office & computing machinery 5.27 0.90 -2.38 5.98 1.38 -2.78
16. Electric appar., Radio, TV ,etc. 3.61 1.97 0.90 4.37 2.67 1.57
17. Shipbuilding and repairing 0.50 1.09 -0.08 0.69 1.49 1.34
18. Other transport, Motor vehicles 1.28 0.61 0.18 1.72 0.91 1.27
19. Aircrafts -0.64 1.17 0.70 -0.11 1.25 2.39
20. Professional goods 5.62 1.57 4.53 7.74 2.72 8.12
21. Other manufacturing industries 2.35 -6.15 1.17 4.79 -5.84 1.58
22. Electricity, gas and water -1.77 0.78 0.62 -1.20 1.61 1.83
23. Construction -1.71 0.23 0.04 -2.18 1.17 0.86
24. Wholesale and retail trade 3.30 3.88 0.37 3.55 4.69 1.28
25. Restaurants and hotels 0.23 2.37 -1.49 0.58 5.38 -0.78
26. Transport and storage 2.90 2.32 3.10 2.48 3.90 3.69
27. Communication 2.47 1.92 2.04 4.03 3.78 6.94
28. Financ. institut. and insurance -1.37 -1.11 -2.75 0.38 -0.55 -0.62
29. Real estate, business services -0.83 0.22 0.30 -1.85 0.29 -2.39
30. Com., soc., personal services -2.42 -2.79 8.32 -2.43 -2.01 10.85
31. Non-market services -5.74 -7.93 -4.17 -3.61 -4.99 -3.19
Aggregate SR -0.26 0.64 0.59 -1.16 3.09 0.03
Aggregate SR (sectors 1-30)
1 0.34 1.74 1.42 -0.70 4.02 0.93
1 Sector ’31 Non-market services’ is not an ‘ordinary industry’. First of all, due to general problems of
accounting for this kind of services we observe inconsistency in the data reported on them for different
countries. Output in non-market services is often measured by their inputs, which makes it impossible
to reveal technological changes there. Second, we reallocated all statistical discrepancy to this sector.
Inconsistencies in accounting for it as well as the presence of statistical discrepancy may bias the
results of the empirical analysis.40 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
The table shows that there is a large diﬀerence in Solow residuals between using
observed prices and output levels and using shadow prices and optimal output levels.
In particular, the latter show a greater variance than the former. This result reﬂects
the fact that optimal prices and production patterns are more volatile than the
observed ones. This is because here we assume perfect mobilityof labor and capital
across sectors and do not account for some trade barriers existing in reality, as for
example, the presence of transportation costs. Consequently, the observed prices
and output levels diﬀer from those computed in the model. The eﬀect of changes
in fundamentals of the economies on the latter is more dramatic than in case of
observed prices and production patterns.
The aggregate Solow residuals in the US and Europe were found to be lower than
those in Japan for either method. Thus, both methods of computation (with observ-
able prices and outputs and with shadow prices and optimal outputs, respectively)
identifyJapan as the TFP growth leader over the period 1985-1990.
The results presented here have to be interpreted carefully. To a large extent they
are explained bythe data used to estimate the model, which themse lves inherited
some distortions from the original data. For example, the surprisinglylow aggregate
Solow residual for the US is probablydue to the fact that the input-output tables
for the US used for the construction of the technical coeﬃcients are not benchmark
tables, but just extrapolations (see the footnote on page 36).The results of the TFP
growth decomposition (3.15) for the three economies are given in Table 3.2. As
explained above the decomposition has been approximated byﬁnite changes, using
the average of two decompositions, with weights of 1985 and 1990.
Table 3.2: Decomposition of the annual TFP growth at shadow prices
Efficiency
change
SR Terms-of-
trade effect
TFP growth
US 0.25 -1.16 1.31 0.40
Japan 0.63 3.09 -1.11 2.60
Europe 3.03 0.03 -1.71 1.35
We can see that changes in eﬃciencywere favorable to Europe, while relat ively
small in the US and Japan. Japan was leading in technical changes over the period.3.5. Results of the Total Factor Productivity growth estimation 41
The terms-of-trade eﬀect was negative in both Japan and Europe, implying that
under free trade some of the welfare gains from changes in the fundamentals of the
European and Japanese economies would be transmitted towards the other coun-
tries.
The aggregate values of TFP growth evaluated at shadow prices are reported in
the last column of Table 3.2. In spite of the negative terms-of-trade eﬀect, Japan
appeared to be a leader in TFP growth.
The latter ﬁnding agrees with that presented in F¨ are et al. (1994). F¨ are et al.
performed a DEA analysis of TFP growth in OECD countries over 1979-1988 and
found that Japan’s productivitygrowth was the highest at the sample. However,
the results identifying the sources of TFP growth appear to be diﬀerent for the two
methods: F¨ are et al. (1994) reports that most of Japan’s TFP growth was due to
eﬃciencychange, while all of the US growth was due to technical change, which is
not in line with what we obtained here.
This urges for a careful interpretation of the results. Notice that although the
terminologyused here is similar to that used in DEA literature, the waywe construct
the frontier and measure technical changes and eﬃciencychanges is diﬀerent from
that used in DEA. In DEA the frontier is determined byinternational benchmarking,
while here we evaluate the potential outcome that the system of three economies
could have achieved under free trade and perfect mobilityof factor inputs. For each
economy, the technical-change component, or Solow Residual, represents a weighted
sum of reductions in technical coeﬃcients of the economywith weights being based
at shadow prices and optimal output levels obtained from the general equilibrium
model. This is in contrast to DEA that identiﬁes technical change with TFP growth
in the best-practice economies.
Finally, let us compare the values of aggregate TFP growth at shadow prices
with those conventionallymeasured. Notice that the conventional measure of TFP
growth is represented bySolow Residuals evaluated at observed prices and output
levels. The latter are given in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3.1, in which the last
two rows show the aggregate numbers for the three economies. The values of SR
aggregated over all sectors do not coincide with the values of aggregate TFP growth
reported in the last column of Table 3.2. However, the two sets of values become
remarkablyclose after the exclusion of sector ‘31 Non-market services’. (See the
footnote on Table 3.1).42 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth Rates
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a method for the estimation of TFP growth, based solely
upon changes in the fundamentals of the economies.
The aggregate TFP growth encompass changes in the marginal valuations of
factor inputs in the economies. These marginal valuations result from interactions
between all counterparts of the system. Since the economies participating in the
system are linked by free trade, changes in tastes, endowments or technologies in
anyof them aﬀect valuations of inputs in all economies and, therefore, inﬂuence
TFP growth. Thus we consider international trade as a source of TFP growth in
the economies.
TFP growth is evaluated at shadow prices and decomposed into Solow Resid-
ual, eﬃciencychange and the eﬀect of change in term of trade. Since the sy stem
encompasses three major open economies, terms of trade are endogenous in the
model.
The theoryhas been applied to estimate the TFP growth in the US, Japan and
Europe (an aggregate of the UK, France and Germany) in 1985-1990. We have
found that the Solow-Residual corresponding to shadow prices and optimal activity
levels are stronglycorrelated with the con ventional measure of TFP growth. Japan
had the highest aggregate TFP growth over the observed period. This was achieved
mostlydue to technical change. In contrast, most of the European TFP growth was
due to eﬃciencychange.3.7. Appendix: Bridge table showing the correspondence between
IODB and ISDB 43
3.7 Appendix: Bridge table showing the corre-
spondence between IODB and ISDB
Title of category
IODB
ISIC code ISIC code Title of category
ISDB
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry,
fishing
1. 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry,
fishing
2 Mining and quarrying 2. 2. Mining and quarrying
3 Food, beverages, tobacco 31. 31. Food, beverages, tobacco
4 Textiles, wearing apparel and
leather industries
32. 32. Textiles, wearing apparel and
leather industries
5 Wood and wood products,
including furniture
33. 33. Wood and wood products,
including furniture
6 Paper and paper products,
printing and publishing
34. 34. Paper and paper products,
printing and publishing
7 Industrial chemicals
Drugs and medicines
351.+352.
8 Petroleum and coal 353.+354.
9 Rubber and plastic products 355.+356.
35. Chemicals and chemical
petroleum, coal, rubber and
plastic products
10 Non-metallic mineral products 36. 36. Non-metallic mineral products
11 Iron and steel 371.
12 Non-ferrous metals 372.
37. Basic metal industries
13 Metal products 381. 381. Fabricated metal products except
machinery and equipment
14 Non-electrical machinery 382.-3825.
15 Office and computing machinery 3825.
382. Machinery except electrical
16 Electric apparatus, n.e.c.
Radio, TV and communication
equipment
383. 383. Electrical machinery apparatus,
appliances and supplies
17 Shipbuilding and repairing 3841.
18 Other transport
Motor vehicles
(384)2.+4.+9.
3843.
19 Aircrafts 3845.
384. Transport equipment
20 Professional goods 385. 385. Professional, scientific,
measuring and controlling
equipment n.e.c., photographic
and optical goods
21 Other manufacturing industries 39. 39. Other manufacturing industries
22 Electricity, gas and water 4. 4. Electricity, gas and water
23 Construction 5. 5. Construction
24 Wholesale and retail trade 61.+62. 61.+62. Wholesale and retail trade
25 Restaurants and hotels 63. 63. Restaurants and hotels
26 Transport and storage 71. 71. Transport and storage
27 Communication 72. 72. Communication
28 Financial institutions, insurance 81.+82. 81.+82. Financial institutions, insurance
29 Real estate and business services 83. 83. Real estate and business services
30 Community, social and personal
services
9. 9. Community, social and personal
services
31 Producers of govern. services
Other producers
Statistical discrepancy
Producers of government
services
Other producers44 3. General Equilibrium Analysis of International TFP Growth RatesChapter 4
Sequential Malmquist indices of
productivity growth: an
application to OECD industrial
activities
This chapter1 presents an application of the Malmquist index approach to studythe
productivityperformance in manufacturing industries in a few d eveloped countries
over the period 1970-90.
I applyboth the standard DEA methodologywith contemporaneous frontiers and
DEA with sequential frontiers and decompose the associated industrial Malmquist
productivityindices into technical change and eﬃciencychange to locate the sources
of productivitygrowth: technical progress and catching up.
The two DEA methodologies diﬀer: sequential DEA implies that the frontier
can shift onlyoutward, while in contemporaneous setting both inward and outward
frontier shifts are possible. Most of DEA literature applies to the second approach.
However, for manufacturing industries, in which technological regress is unlikely
to occur, DEA with sequential frontiers provides a more adequate measure for the
contribution of technical changes than standard DEA.
Combining the two alternative indices in a unifying framework allows us to distin-
guish a new component in the Malmquist index decomposition. The new component
1The results presented in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Shestalova (2000).
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is interpreted as the eﬀect of a business cycle. It reﬂects shifts in the position of the
contemporaneous frontier relativelyto the sequential one.
4.1 Introduction
Since the fundamental paper bySolow (1957), in which he paid attention to the
unexplained part of the growth of the economy, there were a lot of suggestions in
the economic literature on measuring and explaining TFP growth. First, the growth
of factors’ productivitywas viewed purelyas a result of technical progress and the
fact that an economymaybe ineﬃcient was simplyneglected. However, later models
incorporated eﬃciencyinto the analy sis and distinguished b etween two sources of
productivitygrowth: technical progress and catching up. These models construct a
production frontier at each point of time and associate technical changes with shifts
of the frontier. Changes of the position of observations relative to the frontier are
classiﬁed as eﬃciencychanges.
The inclusion of ineﬃciencyin the analy sis produces changes in the results for
TFP growth (as, for example, F¨ are et al. (1994) have noticed). Moreover, diﬀerent
way s of incorporating ineﬃciencyinto the analy sis maylead to diﬀerent estimates
for TFP growth or for the components in its decomposition to technical changes and
eﬃciencychanges. 2
We have alreadydiscussed some of the possible approaches to the incorpora-
tion of ineﬃciencyin chapter 2. One of them is Data Envelopment Analy sis - a
nonparametric approach that constructs a piecewise linear production frontier by
envelopment of available observations on inputs and outputs. In this chapter I apply
two types of DEA - contemporaneous and sequential - and analyze the diﬀerence
between the corresponding indices of TFP growth (contemporaneous and sequential
Malmquist indices) and their decompositions. I propose to combine both indices in a
common framework, which results in the further decomposition of the Malmquist in-
dices into three components: technical progress, contemporaneous eﬃciencychange
and business cycle.
The analysis is applied to the evaluation of productivity performance in manu-
2For example, Perelman (1995) compares the outcome of alternative approaches (parametric
versus nonparametric) and reports that in his case the discrepancies between the estimates of TFP
growth for diﬀerent approaches are rather satisfactory, whilst the results for the decomposition of
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facturing industries in OECD countries. There alreadyexist a few studies apply ing
DEA to the international and interregional analysis of productivity performance at
the level of industryor economy(see F¨ are et al. (1994), Perelman (1995), Gou-
ette and Perelman (1997), Taskin and Zaim (1997), Weber and Domazlicky(1999),
Cella and Pica (2001), etc.), but theyoperate with contemporaneous DEA, not
with sequential DEA. The contemporaneous DEA assumes that the frontier in each
period envelops the observations from this period only. Under such an assumption
the technologyof previous periods maybecome unfeasible in the following periods,
that is, sometimes the frontier maymove inward indicating some ‘technical regress’.
True, this has a reasonable explanation for industries like mining: the more we have
extracted, the more eﬀort and investment it takes to reach deeper layers. But for
manufacturing a decline in productivityis usuallya temporaryphenomenon. Pe-
riods of deteriorations alternate with periods of improvement there, which implies
that it is unlikely that temporaryincreases of inputs without increasing output are
due to technologydeterioration. Classify ing these changes as a technological regress
maybe confusing. In contrast, DEA with sequential frontiers (see, for example, F¨ are
et al. (1985), Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995)) gives another interpretation to
the productivityslowdown. It assumes that in each period of time all preceding
technologies are also feasible. The frontier in a certain time envelops all data points
observed up to this time, which eliminates the possibilityof registering anyregress
bydeﬁnition. 3 Another advantage of sequential DEA is practical. Sequential indices
incorporate past information and are less sensitive than contemporaneous indices to
the presence or not of a particular observation in the sample. I argue, therefore,
that sequential DEA provides a more adequate measure of performance than the
standard DEA does. In particular, it is more appropriate to use sequential frontiers
while evaluating technical changes in manufacturing.
Both contemporaneous and sequential DEA have been applied to the data set
covering 6 industries in 11 OECD countries in 1970-1990. I have found that both
methods give us highly-correlated measures for the overall TFP growth, but (not
surprisingly) less correlated measures for technological changes and for eﬃciency
changes. The correlations between Malmquist indices computed bymeans of con-
3The two cases considered in the present chapter - computations with contemporaneous and
sequential frontiers - do not exhaust all possibilities. One can also consider a “window” type of
computations (Charnes et al. 1985), in which the frontier in time t is based on a few years of
observations.48
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temporaneous DEA and sequential DEA are above 0.97, whilst the correlations
between the technical change components, as well as between eﬃciencychange com-
ponents, are much lower (ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 across industries).
Bysplitting the Malmquist indices into three components, I have shown that
the discrepancyin the measures of TFP growth that theyprovide come from the
component in their decompositions that represents changes of the position of the
contemporaneous frontier relative to the sequential frontier. Two Malmquist indices
coincide either if the two frontiers move together, or if shifts of the contemporaneous
frontier are Hicks neutral.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the methodology, which
will be used to measure the changes in productivityand eﬃciency . Section 4.3
presents the data. Section 4.4 discusses empirical results on the Malmquist indices
and convergence of productivity, and section 4.5 concludes. The Appendix contains
a proof of proposition 4.2.
4.2 Methodology
DEA is a nonparametric method that uses linear programming to construct a non-
parametric piecewise frontier of the data. The frontier represents the best practice
technology. Observations that belong to it are called eﬃcient by default and the
others are ineﬃcient. The eﬃciencyof each observation at a given point in time is
measured bymeans of a distance function, which reﬂects the distance between the
observation and the frontier. The methodologyis described in detail in, for example,
F¨ are and Grosskopf (1996).
4.2.1 DEA with contemporaneous frontiers
Let me start with notation. As before, I denote the input and output vectors for
one countryat time t by xt ∈￿ n
+ and yt ∈￿ m
+, respectively. Let K be the number
of countries in our sample. Then Xt ∈￿ nK
+ and Y t ∈￿ mK
+ contain the observations
on input and output for all countries in the sample at time t.
Technologyin each period t is represented bythe output sets P t(x)={y : x ∈
￿n
+, yt ∈￿ m
+, x can produce y in period t}. We assume that the sets Pt(x) satisfy
strong disposabilityof inputs and constant returns to scale. In the contemporaneous
setting we also assume that any Pt(x) is determined bythe observations on inputs4.2. Methodology 49
and outputs corresponding to period t, that is,
P
t(x)={y : y ￿ Y
tλ,x ￿ X
tλ,λ ￿ 0}, (4.1)
where λ ∈￿ K
+. For anypair of vectors ( x,y) we deﬁne the output distance function
at time t as
D
t
o(x,y) = min{θ : y/θ ∈ P
t(x)}. (4.2)
The output distance function corresponds to the maximum possible proportional
expansion of all outputs given inputs.4 To compute the distance function for some
observation (x,y) we have to solve the following linear program
maxη,λ≥0η
s. t. − ηy + Y tλ ￿ 0
x − Xtλ ￿ 0,
(4.3)
in which η =1 /θ. The corresponding value θ will serve as a measure of overall
technical eﬃciencyfor observation ( x,y).
Note that for each observation the distance function reﬂects the gap between
this observation and the frontier, that is, the gap between the observation and the
leaders. Closing the gap between leaders and followers implies convergence in total
factor productivity. Thus, contemporaneous eﬃciency introduced above provides us
with a natural framework to studythe co nvergence phenomena.
4.2.2 Contemporaneous measure for TFP growth
F¨ are et al. (1989) suggested using the geometric mean of two CCD-type5 Malmquist
indices to measure TFP growth and to locate its sources. In this chapter we follow
the same methodologyand consider
4Alternatively we could use an input distance function, which shows the maximum possible
proportional contraction of all inputs still to be able to produce the same amount of output. This
would lead to the same measure of eﬃciency, because input and output distance functions are
equivalent under the assumption of constant returns to scale (see F¨ are and Grosskopf, 1996).
5CCD refers to Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), who introduced this type of productivity
indices.50
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Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t)=
￿￿
Dt
o(xt+1,y t+1)
Dt
o(xt,y t)
￿￿
Dt+1
o (xt+1,y t+1)
Dt+1
o (xt,y t)
￿￿1/2
(4.4)
Rearranging the terms in formula (4.4), following F¨ are et al. (1989), we obtain the
subsequent formula
Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t) = (4.5)
=
Dt+1
o (xt+1,y t+1)
Dt
o(xt,y t)
￿￿
Dt
o(xt,y t)
Dt+1
o (xt,y t)
￿￿
Dt
o(xt+1,y t+1)
Dt+1
o (xt+1,y t+1)
￿
= EFFCH ×TECH.
The ﬁrst factor in equation (4.5) is called eﬃciencychange and shows the change
of the relative position of an observation and the frontier. Movements of the ob-
servation towards the frontier are associated with values of EFFCH greater than
one and are interpreted as eﬃciencyimprovements (or ‘catching up’). The second
factor, the square root term, represents technical change. It corresponds to the
shift of the frontier. In particular, outward shifts of the frontier reﬂect ‘technical
progress’. An increase in productivityy ields a value of the Malmquist index greater
than unityand a deterioration leads to a less than unityvalue. The same holds for
each component in the decomposition (4.5) above: anyimprovement in eﬃciencyor
technical progress yields a greater than unity value of the corresponding factor.
Notice that according to the deﬁnition, for anytime t the contemporaneous
frontier envelops the data points of time t and does not depend on data of the
previous periods. Under such circumstances the production frontier mayshift either
inward or outward between t and t+1. For manufacturing industries inward shifts of
the contemporaneous best practice frontier are usuallytemporary . Soon the frontier
shifts forward, oﬀsetting a deterioration observed earlier. We suggest that shifts of
this kind should not qualifyas technical change, but as a change of eﬃciencyof the
current leaders.
The contribution of technical change can be estimated bymeans of DEA with
sequential frontiers described in detail in Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995).4.2. Methodology 51
4.2.3 DEA with sequential frontiers
Assume that in anyperiod t the technologyof the previous period, t − 1, is still
feasible. Consequently, all preceding technologies are feasible as well. Then the
production possibilityset expands (or remains constant) from one period to the
next, the technologycan onlyimprove in the course of time, and deteriorations in
productivityperformance are ascribed to reductions in eﬃciency .
Generallyspeaking, the feasibilityof the previous period technologywould have
changed the deﬁnition of the output set at time t as follows,
P
t
(x)={y : y ￿ Y
t
λ,x ￿ X
t
λ,λ ￿ 0}, (4.6)
where X
t
=( ...,Xt0,...,Xt−1,Xt)=( X
t−1
,Xt), Y
t
=( ...,Y t0,...,Yt−1,Yt)=
(Y
t−1
,Yt)a n dt0 is the ﬁrst period, for which observations on inputs and outputs
are available. However, the construction of the last set would require information
on inputs and outputs before anytime t0. Since this information is missing, we have
to truncate set P
t
(x)a ts o m et0 and deﬁne
P
t
(x|X
t0 = X
t0,Y
t0 = Y
t0) = (4.7)
{y : y ￿ (Y
t0,Y
t0+1,...,Y
t) · λ, x ￿ (X
t0,X
t0+1,...,X
t) ·λ, λ ￿ 0}.
The corresponding production set will be the set {(x,y):y ￿ (Y t0,Yt0+1,...,Y t)·λ,
x ￿ (Xt0,Xt0+1,...,Xt) · λ, λ ￿ 0}. Therefore, the linear problem that deﬁnes the
distance function relative to the sequential frontier becomes
maxη,λ≥0η
subject to
−yη +( Y t0,Yt0+1,...,Yt) · λ ￿ 0
x − (Xt0,Xt0+1,...,Xt) ·λ ￿ 0.
The outcome of the latter problem can be used in (4.4) and (4.5) to compute the
sequential Malmquist index and its decomposition. The component TECH thus ob-
tained shows pure technical progress and never indicates regress. All deteriorations
in performance are attributed to the eﬃciencychange component. 6 Since sequential
6Notice, since the construction of the conditional (or sequential) output set at time t uses
information on all time periods within the interval [t0,t], the indices computed starting from
diﬀerent periods will have diﬀerent sized reference sets. In practice, however, as t − t0 increases,
the distinction vanishes.52
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DEA uses past information to construct the frontier, the results of the sequential
method are less sensitive to data attrition than the results of the contemporaneous
method.
4.2.4 Synthesis of the two approaches
Consider the following example.
Example 4.1 There are two countries A and B using the same quantity of input in
year t and year t +1(that is xt
A = x
t+1
A = xt
B = x
t+1
B ) to produce a single output y.
Country A produces 1 unit of output in each year t and t+1(yt
A = y
t+1
A =1 ), while
country B reduces its production from 3 units of output in year t to 2 units in year
t +1(yt
B =3 , y
t+1
B =2 ). Since country B produces more output given the amount
of input, it determines the production frontier in both years.
Now let us compute the Malmquist productivityindices for both countries in this
example. CountryA’s production has not changed between two y ears, therefore,
MA(t,t + 1) = 1 for both contemporaneous and sequential methods. However,
despite the fact that the two Malmquist indices are equal, their decompositions to
technical change and eﬃciencychange are diﬀerent. It appears that in the case of
contemporaneous frontiers eﬃciencyimpr ovement is oﬀset bya negative shift of the
technology: MA(t,t +1 )=1=TECH × EFFCH =
2
3 ×
3
2, while in the case of
sequential frontiers both components show no change: MA(t,t +1 )=1=1× 1.
For countryB the storyis similar. MA(t,t +1 )= 2
3 for both methods. However,
depending on the choice of the reference frontier - contemporaneous or sequential -
it is decomposed as
2
3 × 1 and 1 ×
2
3, which means that the productivitychange is
interpreted as a pure technical change in the case of the contemporaneous Malmquist
index and as a pure eﬃciencychange in the case of the sequential index.
Note that in our example the contribution of a shift of the contemporaneous
frontier relative to the sequential frontier is 2
3. In the case of contemporaneous
frontiers this shift is allocated to the technical change component, while in the case
of sequential frontiers it belongs to the eﬃciencychange. And this is exactlywhat
causes the diﬀerences between the two decompositions. If we separate this factor
and consider the combination of three shifts, shift of the sequential frontier, shift
of the contemporaneous frontier relative to the sequential frontier and shift of an
observation relative the contemporaneous frontier, we obtain that MA(t,t +1 )=4.2. Methodology 53
1=1 × 2
3 × 3
2 and MB(t,t +1 ) = 2
3 =1× 2
3 × 1. Or, more generally M =
TECH S ×
2
3 × EFFCHC.
Consequently, the formulae for the decompositions of the Malmquist indices can
be rewritten as
MC = TECHS ×
TECH C
TECH S
× EFFCH C (4.8)
MS = TECHS ×
EFFCHS
EFFCHC
× EFFCHC (4.9)
Here and below the subscript C refers to the contemporaneous frontier and the
subscript S refers to the sequential frontier. Consequently, the contemporaneous
eﬃciencywill be denoted as θC, while for the sequential measure we will use the
notation θS.
It has been explained that the ﬁrst factor in either of the above decompositions
- the technical change component computed using sequential frontiers - reﬂects pure
improvements of the technology(’technical progress’). The third one - contempo-
raneous eﬃciencychange - shows changes of the gap be tween the leaders and the
followers (’catch up’).
The second factors in (4.8) and (4.9) correspond to shifts of the contempora-
neous frontier relative to the sequential frontier or, in other words, changes of the
position of the contemporaneous best practice relative to the best practice frontier
ever achieved so far. This component measures productivitychange attributable to
the ‘business cycle’ via capacity utilization and labor hoarding.
Note that the two decompositions (4.8) and (4.9) are equivalent if and onlyif
TECHC
TECHS =
EFFCHS
EFFCHC, that is, when the measure of shifts of the contemporaneous
frontier relative to the sequential frontier in (4.8) is the same as that in (4.9).
Obviouslythis component drops out if contemporaneous productivitysets are
expanding (or at lest not shrinking) ‘everywhere’ over time. Then contemporaneous
frontiers coincide with the corresponding sequential ones, and both decompositions
(4.8) and (4.9) lead to the same result.
Proposition 4.1 If for all t, t = t0,t 0 +1 ,...,T, the output sets satisfy {(x,y):
y ￿ Y tλ,x ￿ Xtλ,λ ￿ 0} ⊆{ (x,y):y ￿ Y t+1λ,x ￿ Xt+1λ,λ ￿ 0}, then
MC = MS = TECHS × EFFCHC for all t, t = t0,t 0 +1 ,...,T.54
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Hicks-neutrality7 provides another (suﬃcient) condition for the two indices to
coincide.
Proposition 4.2 If the technology exhibits CRSand there exists an output set ￿ P(x)
that all output sets Pt(x),t= t0,t 0 +1 ,...,T, satisfy the condition
P
t(x)=At ￿ P(x), (4.10)
in which At ∈￿ +, then
TECH C
TECH S =
EFFCHS
EFFCHC and MC = MS.
Let me now turn to the empirical part. The next two sections present the data
and the results.
4.3 Data
The data used in this studycome from the International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB)
constructed bythe OECD statistical division. The ISDB contains a number of data
series on sectoral outputs and primaryfactor inputs in 14 OECD countries (G7 and
seven other countries, namelyAustralia, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway ,
Sweden and Finland). The data are reported with annual frequency. The longest
time series in ISDB cover the period between 1960 and 1995. However, for some
countries the observation of the ﬁrst ten years as well as the last few years are
missing, which prompted the truncation of the time period in the analysis to 1970-
1990. Moreover, three countries (Australia, The Netherlands and Norway) had to
be dropped, because the data were missing for some years and industries.
The studycovers the following manufacturing sectors:
• FOD - Food, beverages, tobacco;
• TEX - Textiles, wearing apparel and leather industries;
• CHE - Chemicals and chemical petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products;
• MNM - Non-metallic mineral products except products of petroleum and coal;
• BMI - Basic metal industries;
7Note, we assume CRS. Condition (4.10) is the condition of Joint Hicks Neutrality for the CRS
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• MEQ - Fabricated metal products, machineryand transport equipment.
Three categories of data are required: data on output, capital, and labor. Indus-
trial value added8 (series ‘GDPD’ in the ISDB classiﬁcation) is taken as output, gross
capital stock (’KTVD’) as capital and total employment (’ET’) as labor. Industrial
value added presented in the ISDB is computed on the base of national accounts.
Gross capital stock is estimated bymeans of a perpetual inventorymodel. Both data
on output and capital are given in constant prices and in US dollars corresponding
to 1990 purchasing power parities.
4.4 Empirical results
In this section I present the empirical ﬁndings. Subsection 4.4.1 summarizes the
results on sequential and contemporaneous indices and their decompositions. In
4.4.2 I studythe evolution of average eﬃciencyin diﬀerent sectors and identifythe
leaders in productivity. I also provide some evidence on the issue of convergence in
TFP on sectoral level.
4.4.1 Analysis of the results on Malmquist indices
First, I compare the Malmquist indices based on the two alternative DEA models.
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of average Malmquist indices in each industry.9 Here
and below the average is computed bymeans of weighted geometric means. The
solid line corresponds to contemporaneous frontiers and the dotted line to sequential
frontiers. We can see that the two lines almost coincide, which indicates that the
two measures of TFP growth produce veryclose results. H owever, this is not the
case for the components in the decompositions of the Malmquist indices. Figure 4.2
demonstrates that the technical change components associated with the alternative
approaches behave diﬀerently. The contemporaneous measureTECHC shows much
more volatilitythan the sequential one. This is because it classiﬁes each change
in productivityof countries that belong to the frontier as technical change. On
8The ISDB gives value added in market prices. The rate of indirect taxes is also included in
the ISDB, but it is missing in many cases. In this work no adjustment for indirect taxes has been
introduced.
9The graph for ’MAN’ presents the results for total manufacturing. ’SUM’ is used for the sum
of six studied industries.56
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the contrary, TECH S registers onlythose changes that lead to the expansion of
the production possibilityset. For example the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979,
which caused overall fall in productivity, appear as declines in TECHC, but have
no impact on TECH S.
Table 4.1 summarizes the correlations between the Malmquist indices and be-
tween their components. The ﬁrst column shows correlations between the Malmquist
indices: all numbers there are above 0.97. The next two columns correspond to eﬃ-
ciencychange and technical change and give much smaller values than those in the
ﬁrst column. We observe that although the correlation between Malmquist indices
is veryhigh, the components show much less correlation. Thus, there is little dis-
crepancybetween the two Malmquist indices while there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in their decompositions. This agrees with our earlier ﬁnding from the analysis of
Figures 4.1 and 4.2: the indices of TFP growth are veryclose, however their de-
compositions provide diﬀerent interpretations to the sources of productivitygrowth.
This is because contemporaneous indices, TECHC, classifyeach change in produc-
tivityof the frontier countries as technical change. Thus they cover both forward
and backward shifts of the frontier. In contrast, sequential indices, TECHS, register
onlythose changes that lead to the expansion of the production possibilityset. The
other changes are attributed to catch-up and reﬂected in EFFCHS.
Table 4.1: Summaryof correlations be tween the alternative Malmquist indices
and their components
industry cor(MC,M S) cor(EFFCH C,EFFCH S) cor(TECH C,TECHS)
FOD 0.971 0.807 0.756
TEX 0.979 0.899 0.712
CHE 0.989 0.444 0.336
MNM 0.991 0.657 0.556
BMI 0.985 0.727 0.470
MEQ 0.984 0.561 0.5224.4. Empirical results 57
Figure 4.1: Evolution of the contemporaneous and sequential Malmquist indices
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
FOD
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
TEX
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
CHE
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
MNM
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
BMI
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
MEQ
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
SUM
70 80 90
0.8
1
1.2
MAN
Mc
Ms58
4. Sequential Malmquist indices of productivity growth: an application
to OECD industrial activities
Figure 4.2: Indices of technical changes (TECH) measured as shifts of the contem-
poraneous and the sequential frontiers correspondingly
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In Table 4.2 we compare the Malmquist indices and the corresponding technical
change and eﬃciencychange components for two subperiods: 1970-80 and 1980-90.
According to both indices, textile industryexperienced the highest TFP growth
over the whole period. Although the technical change component was especially
high in the ﬁrst subperiod, four out of six industries showed a better performance
in the eighties. This later subperiod is characterized bya somewhat higher catch
up than the ﬁrst subperiod. Notice also that in half of the cases we obtain TECH C
less than one, indicating the average decline of productivityof the leaders in the
corresponding industries.
Table 4.2: Comparison of the Malmquist indices and their components for sub-
periods 1970-80 and 1980-90
1970-1980
industry MC MS TECHC TECH S EFFCHC EFFCH S
FOD 1.013 1.018 1.015 1.021 0.998 0.997
TEX 1.026 1.029 1.019 1.024 1.007 1.005
CHE 0.993 0.999 0.984 1.027 1.010 0.973
MNM 1.000 1.001 1.004 1.029 0.996 0.972
BMI 0.984 0.995 0.992 1.020 0.992 0.975
MEQ 1.004 1.007 0.999 1.014 1.005 0.992
1980-1990
industry MC MS TECHC TECH S EFFCHC EFFCH S
FOD 0.995 1.002 0.991 1.011 1.004 0.992
TEX 1.020 1.023 1.018 1.022 1.002 1.001
CHE 1.008 1.012 0.991 1.002 1.018 1.010
MNM 1.007 1.008 0.993 1.001 1.015 1.006
BMI 0.999 1.006 1.013 1.015 0.986 0.991
MEQ 1.016 1.021 1.007 1.011 1.009 1.00960
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Table 4.3 presents the numerical results of the decomposition of TFP growth
indices outlined in (4.8) and (4.9) over the period of 20 years. The average numbers
are computed bymeans of weighted geometric means over the period. The last
column in the table is given for the reader’s convenience, to facilitate the comparison
between the three-term decomposition of the Malmquist indices and their two-term
decomposition (4.5). The highest TFP growth was observed in textile, machinery
and chemical industries, and the lowest in basic metal products. Most of TFP
growth is attributed to technical progress, the contribution was about 1.5-2% in all
industries. The contribution of catching up was modest in most sectors, and even
negative in the case of basic metal industry. Only in chemicals have we found a
strong eﬀect of catching up (1.3%). Therefore, for the average of OECD countries,
the productivitygains in manufacturing are due to technical progress. This result
obtained for separate manufacturing industries agrees with the earlier ﬁnding by
Maudos et al. (2000). The latter applied Malmquist indices to analyze aggregate
TFP growth in OECD countries over the period 1975-1990 and concluded that most
of the productivitygains in OECD countries are attributed to technical progress.
The contribution of the business cycle component appeared to be negative in most
cases. The factor
TECH C
TECHS was always less than
EFFCHS
EFFCHC, which implies that MS was
above MC.
Table 4.3: Decomposition of the Malmquist indices
industry MC EFFCHC
TECH C
TECHS TECHS TECH C
FOD 1.003 1.002 0.986 1.015 1.001
TEX 1.023 1.003 0.997 1.023 1.020
CHE 1.010 1.012 0.985 1.013 0.998
MNM 1.007 1.000 0.992 1.015 1.007
BMI 0.995 0.991 0.987 1.017 1.004
MEQ 1.012 1.005 0.995 1.013 1.008
industry MS EFFCH C
EFFCHS
EFFCHC TECH S EFFCHS
FOD 1.009 1.002 0.993 1.015 0.994
TEX 1.026 1.003 1.000 1.023 1.003
CHE 1.015 1.012 0.990 1.013 1.002
MNM 1.008 1.000 0.993 1.015 0.993
BMI 1.002 0.991 0.994 1.017 0.985
MEQ 1.016 1.005 0.998 1.013 1.0034.4. Empirical results 61
As explained in section 4.2, changes in the position of the current productivity
leaders relative to the sequential frontier are not necessarilychanges in technology .
More likelytheyare attributed to the cy clical processes in the economies. The cor-
responding component has been dubbed as ‘business cycle’ to emphasize its cyclical
nature. Separating eﬀects of technical changes from cyclical behavior is desirable
for the correct interpretation of productivitychanges, as well as for the correct
measuring of technical progress.
Cy cles are closelyrelated to variations in capacityutilization, and so does our
‘business cycle’ (BC) component. The contemporaneous frontier shifts inward when
the utilization of capacityin the best-practice countries decreases, and moves back,
when it restores. I recognize, however, that the eﬀect of capacityutilization on TFP
is much more complex. In particular, changes in capacityutilization contribute to
the eﬃciencychange component as well. 10
4.4.2 Evolution of eﬃciency
In this section I applythe DEA model considered above to analy ze the evolution of
eﬃciencyin the selected sectors. Table 4.4 summarizes the results for the average
eﬃciency θC in each sector for four periods: 1970-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985 and
1986-1990. From these results we can identifytechnological leaders. Theyare listed
in Table 4.5 below. That table shows that in most cases the leaders keep their
leading position over the whole 20-year period.
10Recently De Borger and Kerstens (2000) suggested a way of incorporating of capacity utiliza-
tion variations in the Malmquist index, by separating the variation in capacity utilization from the
eﬃciency change component.62
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Table 4.4: Contemporaneous eﬃciency11
Bel Can Den Fin Fra WG Ita Jap Swe GB US
FOD
1970-75 0.738 0.969 0.364 0.476 0.783 0.785 0.726 1.000 0.713 0.652 1.000
1976-80 0.782 0.953 0.404 0.436 0.806 0.794 0.768 1.000 0.646 0.638 1.000
1981-85 0.821 0.856 0.442 0.447 0.731 0.777 0.773 1.000 0.664 0.663 1.000
1986-90 0.901 0.992 0.510 0.481 0.735 0.858 0.838 1.000 0.744 0.778 1.000
TEX
1970-75 0.654 0.963 0.728 0.595 1.000 0.807 0.824 0.503 0.964 0.934 0.777
1976-80 0.722 1.000 0.838 0.592 0.993 0.885 0.944 0.474 0.846 0.786 0.895
1981-85 0.782 1.000 0.917 0.651 1.000 0.803 0.912 0.512 0.725 0.801 0.908
1986-90 0.868 1.000 0.759 0.658 0.999 0.862 0.970 0.443 0.762 0.793 1.000
CHE
1970-75 0.192 0.404 0.490 0.397 0.643 0.916 0.290 1.000 0.711 0.712 0.722
1976-80 0.313 0.451 0.627 0.421 0.764 0.997 0.465 1.000 0.713 0.800 0.684
1981-85 0.593 0.485 0.663 0.487 0.866 1.000 0.627 1.000 0.741 0.736 0.766
1986-90 0.755 0.545 0.629 0.541 0.880 1.000 0.825 1.000 0.751 0.836 0.925
MNM
1970-75 0.628 1.000 0.744 0.609 0.778 0.781 0.638 0.792 0.753 1.000 0.818
1976-80 0.698 0.985 0.719 0.602 0.887 0.876 0.837 0.657 0.710 1.000 0.809
1981-85 0.939 0.943 0.713 0.748 1.000 0.950 0.836 0.788 0.828 1.000 0.817
1986-90 0.964 0.995 0.576 0.702 1.000 0.884 0.806 0.720 0.780 1.000 0.842
BMI
1970-75 0.507 0.574 0.364 0.339 0.487 0.750 0.589 0.884 0.336 1.000 1.000
1976-80 0.652 0.573 0.309 0.385 0.516 0.885 0.526 0.970 0.343 0.978 0.922
1981-85 0.788 0.554 0.396 0.494 0.531 1.000 0.643 0.957 0.420 1.000 0.846
1986-90 0.786 0.499 0.390 0.447 0.476 1.000 0.571 0.788 0.393 1.000 0.657
MEQ
1970-75 0.865 0.974 0.775 0.544 0.860 0.945 0.597 0.606 0.732 0.914 1.000
1976-80 0.936 1.000 0.742 0.552 0.916 0.976 0.707 0.607 0.676 0.750 1.000
1981-85 0.998 0.990 0.780 0.645 0.907 0.938 0.759 0.795 0.758 0.687 1.000
1986-90 0.932 1.000 0.658 0.746 0.909 0.920 0.808 0.873 0.742 0.747 1.000
11In Table 4.4 ‘Bel’=Belgium, ‘Can’=Canada, ‘Den’=Denmark, ‘Fin’=Finland, ‘Fra’=France,
‘WG’=West Germany, ‘Ita’=Italy, ‘Jap’=Japan, ‘Swe’=Sweden, ‘GB’=Great Britain and ‘US’=the
United States.4.4. Empirical results 63
Table 4.5: The leaders
industry the leading countries
FOD US, Japan, Canada*12
TEX Canada, France, US*
CHE Japan, West Germany*
MNM GB, Canada, France*
BMI GB, West Germany*, US*
MEQ US, Canada, Belgium*
Table 4.6 shows the average eﬃciencylevel of the industries for both methods.
The second column gives lower numbers indicating that the contemporaneous fron-
tier was sometimes shifting back in each industry. The gap between the two eﬃciency
measures is verysmall for the textile industry(less than 1 %), but rather high in
chemicals, basic metal products, and in non-metallic mineral products (about 10%),
suggesting more backward shifts of the contemporaneous frontier in the latter three
industries comparing with the others.
Table 4.6: Average contemporaneous eﬃciency
industry contemporaneous sequential
FOD 0.888 0.851
TEX 0.843 0.834
CHE 0.820 0.707
MNM 0.826 0.737
BMI 0.831 0.733
MEQ 0.898 0.865
As noted in section 4.2, contemporaneous eﬃciencyprovides us with a natural
framework for studying convergence. The issue of convergence in TFP goes back
to Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), who ﬁrst pointed out that not only aggregate labor
productivitylevels of industrialized countries co nverge over time, but also their TFP
levels. (See also Wolﬀ (1993) and Baumol et al. (1994), Carree et al. (2000) for
discussion of convergence on both aggregate and sectoral levels.)
12A star next to a country name indicates that the country was leading not over the whole
20-year period.64
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Convergence means that observations move towards each other in the course
of time. The distance function reﬂects the distance between observations and the
frontier. If there is convergence in TFP, then the mean eﬃciency13 in the industry
should approach to one with time, while the coeﬃcient of variation should decline
(the so-called σ-convergence, this terminologyis due to Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1991). Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of the average eﬃciencyand the correspond-
ing coeﬃcient of variation in each industry. Strong convergence of TFP levels is
observed in chemicals. There are also some indications of convergence in food in-
dustryand machinery . The last two graphs labelled by‘SUM’ and ‘MAN’ present
the results for the total of the six considered industries and for total manufacturing
correspondingly. For this sample of eleven countriesover the considered period signs
of convergence of TFP are present on the aggregate level as well.
Another convergence hypothesis (β-convergence) asserts that a countrywith a
lower initial TFP level should have a higher TFP growth. This implies that cor-
relation between the initial eﬃciencyand the subsequent indices of TFP growth
should be negative. The correlation analysis has shown that this was the case in
chemicals, food industryand total manufacturing. The correlations for these sectors
are negative and signiﬁcant at 95% level. Combining this result with the former, I
conclude that these industries exhibit both σ-convergence and β-convergence.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter two approaches have been used to evaluate the TFP growth in man-
ufacturing in eleven OECD countries, namelyDEA with contemporaneous frontiers
and DEA with sequential frontiers. It has been demonstrated that both meth-
ods produce highlycorrelated results for the total measure of TFP growth, but
less correlated results for the decomposition into technical changes and eﬃciency
changes. The sequential measure takes past information into account and reallo-
cates temporarybackwards shifts in the productivityof the best-practice countries
to the eﬃciencychange component, whilst the contemporaneous measure accounts
for them as a technical regress. The former is more suitable for measuring technical
changes in manufacturing.
13In this paragraph and in Figure 4.3 I use simple arithmetic means and the standard coeﬃcient
of variation, since they are commonly used in literature on convergence.4.5. Conclusion 65
Figure 4.3: Evolution of the average eﬃciencyand coeﬃcient of variation in each
industry
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I suggest a decomposition of Malmquist indices, which links the two measures of
TFP growth with each other. The new decomposition distinguishes three sources of
TFP growth: technical progress, catching up and business cycle.
The empirical analysis has shown that most productivity increase in manufactur-
ing in the OECD countries during the period 1970-1990 can be ascribed to technical
progress. Five out of the six considered manufacturing sectors showed little or no
catching up. Onlyin chemicals eﬃciencychanges were substantial. I have found the
strongest convergence of TFP levels for this sector. The contribution of the business
cycle component of TFP growth appeared to be negative in most cases.
4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2
If condition (4.10) holds, then the distance functions computed relative to the
contemporaneous frontiers satisfythe condition Dt
o(x,y)=￿ Do(x,y)/At. Therefore
the formula for the contemporaneous Malmquist index can be rewritten as follows:
Mo(x
t+1,y
t+1,x
t,y
t)=
￿￿
Dt
o(xt+1,yt+1)
Dt
o(xt,yt)
￿￿
Dt+1
o (xt+1,yt+1)
Dt+1
o (xt,yt)
￿￿1/2
=
=
￿￿
￿ Do(xt+1,y t+1)
At
At
￿ Do(xt,yt)
￿￿
￿ Do(xt+1,y t+1)
At+1
At+1
￿ Do(xt,yt)
￿￿1/2
=
￿ Do(xt+1,y t+1)
￿ Do(xt,y t)
.
Condition (4.10) implies that the sequential output sets satisfy P
t
(x)=m a x t0≤s≤t As·
￿ P(x)=Bt · ￿ P(x), where Bt = maxt0≤s≤t As, and consequently, distance functions
based on sequential frontiers have to satisfy D
t
o(x,y)=￿ Do(x,y)/Bt. Therefore,
the formula for the sequential index can be reduced the same wayas ab ove, which
completes the proof.Part II
Incentive regulation and
productivity performance
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In the last few decades network industries such as electricity, gas and water
supplyhave been undergoing major structural changes. In most European countries
the utilitysector, which has traditionallybeen a public mon opoly, has been split
verticallyinto separate segments: production, transportation over the network, and
supply(or retail). While production and supplyactivities are considered to be
competitive (at least potentially)14, the transportation activityoperated byregional
monopolists requires government intervention. Two reasons: ﬁrst, because network
companies mayextract monopolyrents from consumers; second, because shares of
a network companycan be held bysupplyand/or production companies and the
network companymaydisadvantage competitors in production or supply . Therefore,
a regulatorybodyis ty picallyassigned to set a price control as to encourage the
eﬃcient use of the transportation system in the market context.
A transportation system includes a national transmission system operator man-
aging the main grid (typical in electricity and gas) and many regional distribution
companies transporting the commodityfurther to the ﬁnal customers. Both the
transmission and the distribution businesses are highlycapital intensive. Facing un-
certaintyabout future demand for transportation services, companies have to sink
substantial investments before actual demand is realized. Once put in place, the
grid serves customers for a long period of time (up to 50 years) and the capital
costs are eventuallyrecovered from customers. Customers often have to bear the
risk of poor investment decisions byeither pay ing an excessive price if the network
has been goldplated (if there has been over-investment) or suﬀering from inadequate
reliabilityof service if the installed capacityis insuﬃcient.
In competitive industries with long-lasting investments, the most proﬁtable com-
panywill be the one who predicted demand best and invested accordingly . Then
the service is reliable, while per-unit cost is relativelylow, and the companyearns
an adequate return on investment. In contrast, a companynot utilizing its assets
will not recover their ﬁxed costs and will face a risk of bankruptcy. The market
mechanism determines who gets rewarded or punished.
In regulated industries judgement is passed bya regulator. The regulator wants
to prevent oversized projects, while giving companies incentives to operate eﬃciently
and maintain a reliable service. His task in protecting the customers is to set a regime
that would maintain a reasonable balance between the prices for transportation
14For a more detailed discussion on industries featuring both competitive and non-competitve
components and seperation of these components, see OECD (2001).70
services and the achieved level of reliabilityof supply . However, due to asymmetric
information about demand, costs and technology, the regulator faces both moral
hazard and adverse selection problems (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993), which complicate
his task.
This part of the thesis presents a model of regulation of regional network com-
panies of the utilitymarket. It starts with a review of the literature on regulation of
natural monopolies, given in chapter 5, followed bythe presen tation of the model in
chapter 6. The results of chapter 6 were ﬁrst formulated in Mikkers and Shestalova
(2001), in which we develop a framework that can be used byregulatorybodies to
analyze the trade-oﬀ between prices and reliability of services (deﬁned as the proba-
bilityof interruption of the service) and demonstrate how the y ardstick competition
method can be augmented to factor in reliabilityof supply .Chapter 5
Review of literature on regulation
In the earlyexamples of regulation, franchised mon opolies were typically subject
to cost-of-service regulation. Under such a scheme revenues are set equal to costs
(including a fair and reasonable rate of return) to eliminate the consumer welfare
losses associated with monopolistic price distortions. However, as was noted in the
sixties, this type of regulation does not motivate the ﬁrm to operate eﬃciently.
On the contrary, since the oﬀered rates of return are typically higher than the
market cost of capital, ﬁrms have an incentive to overinvest in their assets - the
so-called Averch-Johnson eﬀect, ﬁrst described by Averch and Johnson (1962) and
then conﬁrmed empiricallybymanyother studies (see, e.g., Courville, 1974). As a
consequence of this, public utilities tend to adhere to excessivelyhigh standards of
reliabilityand uninterruptibilityof service achieved bybuilding costlyand largely
redundant networks (Kahn, 1995).
To mitigate ineﬃciencycaused bya cost-of-service ty pe of regulation the regula-
tor can disallow ‘not used and useful’ investments to enter the rate base. According
to Gilbert and Newbery(1988), this can overcome the ﬁrm’s tendencyto overinvest
and can lead it to the choice of an eﬃcient investment path in inﬁnitelyrepeated
regulatoryinteractions. Since the rate base (accumulated investments) determines
the level of the ﬁrms’ proﬁt, its determination has been, as Kahn wrote, “byfar the
most hotlycontested aspect of regulation, consuming byfar the greatest amount of
time of both commissions and courts”. (Kahn, 1995, p. 36/I.) Due to asymmetric
information about the cost and the eﬀectiveness of investment, the regulator often
cannot impose the desired level of investment on the ﬁrm.
Another problem with cost-of-service regulation was pointed out byBaumol and
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Klevorick (1970), who showed that cost-of service regulation does not reward ex-
traordinaryentrepreneurial accomplishment. An inﬂexible application of cost-plus
schemes might eliminate a ﬁnancial reward for eﬃciencyand innovation. Baumol
and Klevorick (1970) suggested that introducing a regulatorylag could stimulate
productivityimpr ovement similarlyto the mechanism of the Schumpeterian inno-
vation process.
Littlechild (1983) formalized the regulatorylag and advised to the British Tele-
com regulator to introduce for the ﬁrst time in regulatorypractice the so-called
price-cap scheme - a high powered incentive scheme in which the prices (in real
terms) are ﬁxed for a few years, giving the companies incentives to reduce the costs.
Unfortunately, this did not completely solve the problem. Giulietti and Waddams-
Price (2000) showed empiricallythat ﬁrms play ed strategic games anticipating price
reviews. Giulietti and Waddams-Price came to the conclusion that ﬁrms regulated
byprice caps are not maximizing their proﬁts within their regulatoryconstraints, be-
cause theyact strategicallyand are more concerned with long-run issues of resetting
the price cap.
As long as prices are directlylinked to costs, incentives to operate eﬃcientlyre-
main weak. As pointed out byJoskow and Schmalensee (1986), price-cap regulation
and cost-of-service regulation are similar in this respect. Bogetoft (2000) stressed
that in a dynamic setting price-cap regulation does not guarantee cost eﬃciency,
because the regulator has imperfect information about the cost functions of ﬁrms.
Making judgements about the exogenous factors that inﬂuence the cost of a com-
pany, the regulator faces moral hazard and adverse selection problems. (See, e.g.,
Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993)
In competitive markets, price is a parameter to the seller - it is determined by
market forces (’the invisible hand’) and not subject to the individual seller’s control,
creating the pressure to improve productivityand qualityof products/services. In
contrast, the absence of competitive pressures leads in general to an increase of cost.
(See Leibenstein, 1966.) Regulation (sometimes called ‘the visible hand’) can mimic
the competitive forces. The regulator needs some benchmark other than the ﬁrm’s
present or past performance, against which to evaluate the ﬁrm’s potential.
Shleifer (1985) proposed to use a yardstick competition regime, in which the
regulator sets a price-cap for a ﬁrm based on average cost of the other companies
and allows the ﬁrm to keep the diﬀerence between the cap and the realized cost.
Since prices in this scheme are based on average cost of other companies, exogenous73
shocks that aﬀect the cost of the whole industryinﬂuence the price. The idea was
developed further. In particular, Lyon (1991) applied it to evaluate disallowances of
the recoveryof construction costs. He suggested that hindsight reviews should be
based on the lowest observable cost rather than on average other ﬁrms’ costs. Fur-
thermore, Bogetoft (1994, 1997) investigated the use of Data Envelopment Analysis
in regulatoryenvironments with technological uncertaintyand sh owed that DEA-
based reimbursement schemes (’DEA-based yardstick competition’) may be optimal
in this context.
Although there is a concern that sectors with an insuﬃcient number of ﬁrms
feature a risk of explicit or tacit collusion among participants (see, e.g., Tirole,
1988), even under such circumstances there are ways to make yardstick competition
a success. For example, a collusion can be prevented byse tting a reward for the
ﬁrm that ﬂags the coalition. (Bogetoft, 1995.)
The ﬁrms under yardstick regulation should face the same production opportu-
nities and demand functions. In practice, yardstick competition can be implemented
as long as the diﬀerences in circumstances are known. Still, some loss of incentive
compared to a trulyexternal competitive test arises due to the asy mmetryof in-
formation. Each ﬁrm mayargue that its costs are higher than that of its ‘shadow
ﬁrm’, because of diﬀerences in circumstances. (Newbery, 1999.)
In the aforementioned yardstick competition schemes, the rewards depend on
performance: if a ﬁrm outperforms the yardstick it earns a higher proﬁt, otherwise
it mayincur losses. Yardstick competition thus mimics market forces and pro-
vides strong incentives to reduce cost and to improve eﬃciency. These cost-reducing
incentives are especiallystrong in the short run, but unfortunatelymayhave an
adverse eﬀect on investment in long-run objectives. In particular, a ﬁrm can delay
an upgrade or the installation of new capacity, which may not aﬀect today’s per-
formance, but result in the deterioration of performance in the future, aﬀecting the
qualityof services (as seems to have happened in the case of the British Rai lways).
To curb these undesirable eﬀects price-cap regimes should be enhanced with some
mechanism regulating quality.1
One aspect of quality , namelythe reliabilityof service, is especiallyimportant
in electricityregulation. Shortages occur due to the stochastic nature of demand:
1This holds also in static models without investment: if prices cannot be raised, but quality
can be lowered (without the regulator noticing it), then quality will be lowered below the eﬃcient
level.74 5. Review of literature on regulation
demand maysometimes exceed capacity , leading to an interruption of service. Two
main issues arise. First, how much capacityto install, and second, how to ration
the customers when an interruption occurs.
The existing literature presents results on possible price and rationing practices
(see, e.g., Brown and Johnson, 1969, Jen and Tschirhart, 1979, Spulber, 1992),
and emphasizes the importance of investment decisions and optimal capacitychoice
under uncertain demand. In particular, manyauthors highlight that excess capacity
is not necessarilyevidence of productive ineﬃciency , but maybe an optimal response
bya ﬁrm to uncertainty(Mey er, 1975, Nickel, 1978). As shown byNickerson and
Reynolds (1990), a non-negative response of optimal capacity to increased demand
uncertaintymaybe demo nstrated for a general class of consumer preferences.
On the other hand, changes in capacity, and thus reliability of services, also
produce an impact on consumers demand. Coate and Panzar (1989) show that
an increase of system reliability shifts the consumer demand curve outward and,
therefore, that the optimal pricing rule should incorporate reliability. According to
them, the optimal price should be equal to the marginal cost of providing another
unit of electricitywithout degrading the quality(reliability ) of service. The result
of Coate and Panzar highlights the importance of the right mix between price and
qualityin the maximization of social welfare.
In the next chapter we analyze a similar issue and design a regulatory scheme
which will resolve the trade-oﬀ between price and qualityunder information asy m-
metry.Chapter 6
The model of yardstick
competition of network utilities
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter1 we develop a framework that can be used byregulatorybodies to
analyze the trade-oﬀ between prices and reliability of services (deﬁned as the prob-
abilityof interruption of the service) and demonstrate how the traditional y ardstick
competition could be augmented to take reliabilityof supplyinto account. This can
be achieved byimplementing a simple performance based mechanism combining
prices and penalties.
We consider a model of yardstick competition among distribution utilities operat-
ing in diﬀerent regions but facing similar circumstances. Under demand uncertainty,
given private information on parameters of the distribution of demand in the region,
the companies choose the amount of capacityto install, as well as the amount of
‘slack’ (i.e. unnecessaryspending that could have been avoided if more eﬀort had
been exercised). The installed capacityis related to the probabilityof failure and
thus to the level of reliability. The regulator does not know the minimum installa-
tion cost and does not observe the amount of capacityinstalled directly , but has to
induce the companies to operate eﬃcientlyand choose the socially -optimal capacity
level.
We show that a yardstick competition scheme that does not penalize network
failures, is suboptimal and leads to underinvestment. In contrast, the socially-
1The results presented in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Mikkers and Shestalova (2001).
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optimal outcome can be achieved byintroducing penalties for undersupplyequal to
the value of the associated losses perceived bythe customers 2. Then the potentially
external costs of inadequate supplyare internalized bythe companies and hence
taken into account in making their investment decisions. Given that the regulator
does not observe the ﬁrm’s technology, the main problem is how to set prices that
enable utilities to have suﬃcient expected revenue to cover both the eﬃcient cost
and the risk of shortfall, which will be reﬂected in ﬁnes that theyoccasionally
have to pay. We solve this problem by introducing a yardstick competition regime
augmented to incorporate the risk of network failure. Since we assume that all ﬁrms
are able to achieve the same minimum installation cost, the proposed regulation
scheme emerges as ﬁrst best.
The chapter is organized as follows. We explain the model in section 6.2, which
we solve in section 6.3. Section 6.4 provides a policyanaly sis, followed bya discussion
of an application to yardstick competition in section 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
6.2 The model
In most of the European countries the electricitysector has been split into produc-
tion, transmission, distribution and supply, each segment being operated by diﬀerent
ﬁrms. Here we focus on the distribution segment of the market, operated byregional
network companies. Distribution companies maintain the regional network and de-
liver energyto the local customers.
The structure of the distribution segment of the market is shown in Figure 6.1.
Assume that there are N regions, in each of which there is a network company
supplying this region with a particular service (such as distribution of electricity,
gas or water). We denote the quantitydelivered by y, y ∈ R+. The provision of
service y maybe limited bythe capacityof the regional distribution n etwork, the
installation and operation of which is under the ﬁrm’s control.
Regional ﬁrms are monopolists and subject to regulation. Both the ﬁrms and
the regulator face uncertainty about the realization of the consumers’ demand for
the service, however, the ﬁrms have private information about the range in which
2This result presumes risk-neutrality of both the ﬁrms and the customers.6.2. The model 77
demand will fall. The task of the regulator is to ensure eﬃcient operation and to
set prices maximizing the consumers’ welfare under information asymmetry.
Figure 6.1: Distribution segment
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The presentation of the model is organized as follows. We start with a descrip-
tion of the consumer preferences and the technologyin sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2,
respectively. Then we touch upon the issue of the information asymmetry in section
6.2.3. Section 6.2.4 outlines the timing. Finally, section 6.2.5 refers to the problem
of the regulator, which will be solved in section 6.3.
6.2.1 Consumer preferences
The utilitythat a consumer derives from consumption of distribution services de-
pends on his demand for the distributed commodityitself. It reaches satiation as
soon as the consumer’s demand for the commodityat a ﬁxed price is fulﬁlled. For
example, in the case of electricityprovision, the customer’s utilityfrom having an ex-
tra unit of available transportation capacitybecomes zero as soon as he has already
been provided with enough electricity. The satiation point is the point in which
the demand for electricity(a commodity ) is realized. It is subject to exogenous
shocks, such as changes in fuel prices, structural changes in the region or weather
conditions (adapting the use of electric heating or air conditioning). When supply
is interrupted the consumers suﬀer, because theyderive less utilitythan theywould
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To capture this, we assume that the consumers’ preferences in region i, i =
1,2,...N are represented bya utilityfunction
U(m,y,Yi,κ)=m + u(y,Yi,κ)
where m is the numeraire commodity, so that income eﬀect is absent. Consumers’
beneﬁts of distribution services have the form
u(y,Yi,κ)=κmin(y,Yi)
where Yi is a random variable with cumulative probabilitydistribution F(Yi):
[a,b] → [0,1] and κ is a ﬁxed parameter reﬂecting consumers’ marginal willingness
to payfor the service purchased from the regulated ﬁrm. 3
Figure 6.2: Consumers’ beneﬁts
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Figure 6.2 shows the consumers’ beneﬁts of distribution service. Function u
increases at constant rate κ (see Remark 6.1 at the end of this section for a discussion
3A similar representation of the consumer preferences can be found in Spulber (1988, 1992). In
Spulber’s notations the consumer’s utility function takes the form ζ +U(q,θ,ω), in which q is the
amount of the good purchased from the regulated ﬁrm, θ is a parameter characterizing a type of
consumer, ω is the state of world and ζ is a numeraire commodity. Spulber’s (ζ,q,θ,ω) corresponds
to our (m,y,κ,Yi). The functional forms are diﬀerent. In particular we assume satiation at Yi and
constant marginal willingness to pay for the service until the satiation is reached.6.2. The model 79
Figure 6.3: Indiﬀerence curves
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of this assumption) until the satiation level Yi has been reached and stays the same
if the consumer is supplied with more than Yi of this service. Consequently, demand
for distribution services is perfectlyinelastic and equal to Yi as long as the price is
below κ. For short we will call Yi ‘demand’.
If demand is fulﬁlled, then u(y,Yi,κ) equals umax(Yi,κ)=κYi. The expression
for u can be rearranged as
u(y,Yi,κ)=κYi + κmin(y − Yi,0) = umax(Yi,κ) − κ(Yi − y)+
in which the second terms reﬂects consumer’s disutilityof nondelivered ( Yi −y)+ =
max(0,Y i − y) units of service.
The consumer surplus, Si, is the diﬀerence between the beneﬁts of delivered
services and the payment for it. Thus, Si = u(y,Yi,κ) − Ri, in which Ri is the
revenue paid to the ﬁrm.
Remark 6.1 The assumption of a constant marginal willingness to pay introduced
above is driven by practical concerns. Function u considered above represents the
utilities of the whole region and is the sum of individual utilities, which generally
speaking may not be characterized by a constant marginal willingness to pay for the
service. When the system fails, some consumers are rationed, while others are not,80 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
and (even in the case of identical customers) the losses caused by a shortfall will
vary depending on the allocation of the lost load over the population of the region.
A practical solution to this problem would be to average diﬀerences out by taking κ
to be constant for each type of customers and to reﬂect their average disutility of an
undelivered unit. Our model deals with one type of customer, but in principle can be
generalized for the case of diﬀerent types of customers with diﬀerent (but constant)
κ’s, for example, industrial and residential customers. (This would imply a model
of the rationing behavior of monopolists. See more on the latter issue in, e.g., Jen
and Tschirhart, 1979, Coate and Panzar, 1989, Ahn et al., 1992, Spulber, 1992.)
In practice, the marginal willingness to pay to avoid an interruption of supply can
be estimated on the base of surveys.4
6.2.2 Technology
Among empirical papers analyzing the economies of scale in the utility sector there
are both those supporting the economyof scale 5 and those which do not. Examples
of the latter are Huettner and Landon (1978) and Kittelsen (1993)6 on electricity
transmission and distribution, Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998)7, Saal and Parker
(2001)8 on water-supplyindustry , etc. Although in theorymonopolies are often
characterized byincreasing returns to scale (IRS), it is not the presence of IRS per
se, but rather subadditivityof costs and restrictions on free entryand exit that make
the market not competitive, as explained e.g. in Baumol et al. (1982).
The monopolistic character of the network businesses is due to large speciﬁc
investment that ﬁrms have to sink before serving the customers. The investment
4For example, a series of surveys on customers’ interruption costs was conducted in Norway in
1989-1991. Industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors were asked for direct costs associated
with the interruptions of the power supply for speciﬁed number of hours. Residentilal customers
were asked for willingness to pay to avoid interruptions. Basing on this the Norwegian regulator
NVE estimated the average speciﬁc interruption cost per kWh, which was later used in regulation.
(See Langset, 2001.) See also Caves et al. (1990) for a review of the outage cost literature.
5See, for example, Pollitt (1995), Dismukes et al. (1998), etc.
6Kittelsen (1993) has done a research on the Norwegian electricity distribution companies and
found that the estimate of the VRS production set is indistinguishable from the CRS estimate for
most of sizes observed.
7Cubbin and Tzanidakis (1998) have found modest economies of scale, insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from CRS.
8Saal and Parker (2001) estimate the scale elasticity to be in the range between 0.83 and 0.88
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involves the installation of a ﬁxed and unmovable connection between producer
and customer, a duplication of which is ineﬃcient. After the capacityhas been
put in place, the costs are sunk, and the provision of transportation services is
done virtuallyat no cost 9, until the existing capacityis exhausted. Then a new
installation takes place. In the long run, the ﬁrm adjusts the amount of capacityin
accordance with the long-term trends in consumers’ demand.
Assume that starting from some size Q0 (Q0 <a , where a is the lower limit of
the support of the demand distribution) the technologyfor installation of capacity
for provision of good y exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) and is given by
I =( c + δ)Q. Here I is the amount of a numeraire good which has to be spent to
install and operate capacity Q, c is a technical parameter reﬂecting minimal cost,
which we assume to be the same in each region, and δ is a (per-unit) slack parameter.
Having installed Q, a distribution utilitycan actuallytransport min( Y,Q) units of
y, where Y is the demand for service y.
We deﬁne reliabilityof supply , ρ, as the probabilityof meeting the demand, that
is, ρ =P r {Y< Q }. Therefore, each level of capacity Q corresponds to a certain
level of reliabilityof supply ρ.
Suppose that ﬁrms can attract capital at rate r (r is the opportunitycost of
capital), which is exogenouslygiven. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt π is expressed as π = R −
(1 + r)I, where R is revenue.10
Following Bogetoft (2000), we assume that the ﬁrms are risk neutral, seeking to
maximize a weighted sum of their expected proﬁt and slack. The ﬁrm’s expected
utilityis represented by
E[U
f(δ,Q)] = E[π + ω(δQ)] = E[R] −(1 + r)I + ω(δQ)
where ω is a ﬁxed parameter that describes the ﬁrm’s value of slack relative to proﬁt.
We assume ω ∈ [0,1], that is, proﬁt is more valuable to the ﬁrm than slack (because
9Since we focus on sunk costs problem here, we assume that the installed capacity can be
operated and maintained at no cost. This simpliﬁes the problem and allows us to avoid a discussion
of allocation between ﬁxed and variable costs, which is a really important issue in rate-of-return
regulation, but has less relevance in our case, since prices are based on eﬃcient total costs no
matter what the allocation between ﬁxed and variable cost is. Operation and maintenance cost
can be easily incorporated in the model. The analysis still holds after the inclusion of these costs.
10Notice that cost of investment includes normal return on capital, r. Therefore, according to
the terminology applied by business literature, π represents ’value creation’.82 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
slack can be consumed only‘on-the-job’ - Bogetoft, 2000, p.13). Notice that the
inclusion of the utilityof having slack has the same meaning as the inclusion of
disutilityof eﬀorts: it costs eﬀorts to eliminate slack. As Hicks noted: “The best
monopolyproﬁt is a quiet life”. (Hicks, 1935, p.8.)
Without loss of generalitywe let the ﬁrm’s reservation utilitybe 0.
We will also assume that (1 + r)cb < κE [Y ], where b is the upper bound of
the domain of function F(·) introduced on p.78, and c is the minimal installation
cost per unit of capacity, i.e., the ﬁrst-best per-unit cost. That is, the consumer
willingness to payfor having enough capacityto meet expected demand exceeds the
ﬁrst-best cost of installation of maximal relevant capacity.
6.2.3 Information asymmetry
We assume that all Yi are independent of each other and drawn from the same
distribution, with the cumulative probabilitydistribution function F(Yi):[ a,b] →
[0,1] deﬁned by F(Yi)=￿ F(
Yi−a
b−a ) for some distribution function ￿ F :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1].
Parameters a and b are the same across ﬁrms. Theyare known to the ﬁrms, but not
to the regulator. This speciﬁes the common information set of the ﬁrms: {￿ F,a,b}.
Furthermore, we consider network companies operating under similar circum-
stances. Therefore, we assume the technical parameter c to be the same for all
ﬁrms, however, unknown to the regulator who observes onlytotal cost I =( c+δ)Q.
An important implication of our simplifying assumption of identical minimal
costs is that the proposed yardstick competition scheme emerges as ﬁrst best. If
the number of observations is suﬃcient, the present analysis could be extended
to incorporate the environmental diﬀerences, for example along the lines proposed
byShleifer (1985) or Bogetoft (1997). An extension to the case of diﬀerent ty pes
of ﬁrms maybe at the expense of shifting to the second-best outcome as in the
standard Laﬀont-Tirole problem incorporating unobservable variation in types as
well as eﬀorts (see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993, for more discussion) and will not be
considered here.
The economic literature alreadyoﬀers schemes that would lead to the “full sur-
plus extraction” (e.g., McAfee et al., 1989, McAfee and Reny, 1992), however, there
are complications with their implementation in practice. Our approach is to con-
struct a scheme that would be simple and practical.6.2. The model 83
6.2.4 Timing
Figure 6.4 shows the timing of the game. It is a one-period model: during the period
the ﬁrms install capacity, provide the service and receive a payment.
First, the regulator oﬀers a contract to the ﬁrms. A contract speciﬁes the pay-
ment to the ﬁrm as a function of variables which will be observable at the end of
the period. The functional form depends on the type of regulation chosen by the
regulator.
Second, the ﬁrms costlesslylearn private information about the support of the
distribution of demand, [a,b], and decide to accept or reject the contract. After
a contract is accepted a ﬁrm makes its investment decision and installs capacity.
Notice that the companies need to make the investment decision and sink costs
before the demand is realized. The investment is irreversible and will be completely
depreciated at the end of the period.
Third, all Yi,( Yi−Qi)+ and Ii become observable11. The ﬁrm provides its service
to the customers and receives revenue in return. Note that Qi is not observable by
the regulator.12
11Strictly speaking, what the regulator observes is the number of delivered units, that is
min(Yi,Q i). Number of undelivered units (Yi −Qi)+ is not directly observable, however it can be
estimated by the regulator on the base of information on time of interruptions and typical load pro-
ﬁles of the aﬀected customers over that time. Consequently Yi c a nbeo b t a i ne da sYi =m i n ( Yi,Q i)+
(Yi − Qi)+.
12Obviously the installed capacity, Qi, is not observable for those ﬁrms for which demand has not
hit the capacity, Yi ￿ Qi. But even if capacity is observable ex-post, there still exists informational
asymmetry about what was the optimal capacity ex-ante, due to the private information about
the demand distribution.84 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
Figure 6.4: Timeline
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6.2.5 Regulation
The task of the regulator is to design a contract, that would promote eﬃcient op-
eration and allocate the welfare gains to consumers. He seeks to prevent waste or
misuse of resources and to assure cost control, in order to achieve eﬃcient pricing of
services and to eliminate welfare losses caused byprice distortions. Thus, the reg-
ulator wants to maximize the consumer surplus (which is the same as to minimize
the expected cost of making the ﬁrms to accept employment and disutility of losses)
and to minimize the ﬁrms’ incurred costs.
The contract speciﬁes the payment to each ﬁrm i, Ri = R(Yi,(Yi−Qi)+,I i,Y −i,(Y−i−
Q−i)+,I −i), as a function of the observable data on ﬁrm i as well on all the other
ﬁrms (for which we use notation −i) so as to maximize the consumers’ expected
surplus in the region, while ensuring a nonnegative expected proﬁt to the regional
company.
Since the demand distribution is conditional on a and b, the expected consumer
surplus in the region is also conditional on them. The regulator does not observe
the support of demand distribution, but has beliefs about a and b. We will show
that it is possible to specifya regulation scheme that does not depend on the values
of a and b.6.3. Solving the problem 85
We formulate the regulator’s problem as follows
V (Qi,δ i) = max
R,Qi,δi
Ea,bEY |a,b[Si] (6.1)
subject to
EY |a,b[R(Yi,(Yi − Qi)+,(c + δ)Qi,Y −i,(Y−i −Q−i)+,I −i)]− (IR)
−(1 + r)(c + δ)Qi ￿ 0
EY |a,b[R(Yi,(Yi − Qi)+,(c + δi)Qi,Y −i,(Y−i −Q−i)+,I −i)] − (IC)
−(1 + r)(c + δi)Qi + ωδiQi ￿
￿ EY |a,b[R(Yi,(Yi − Q)+,(c + δ)Q,Y−i,(Y−i − Q−i)+,I −i)] − (6.2)
−(1 + r)(c + δ)Q + ωδQ ∀Q,δ > 0.
Here EY |a,b = EY1...YN|a,b denotes the expectation conditionallyto the parameters of
the distribution of the random variable Y .
The ﬁrst constraint is the individual rationality(IR) or, in other words, the
participation constraint. It implies that the ﬁrm is willing to stayin business: it
expects to at least earn its investment back and receive return on investment of at
least r. The second, called incentive compatibility(IC), say s that the maximum of
the ﬁrm’s utilityis achieved when the ﬁrm chooses slack and the amount of capacity
maximizing the consumers’ welfare. The latter implies that the ﬁrm chooses the
optimal reliabilitylevel.
Under the information asymmetry about a and b, the regulator can specifythe
contract (the expression for R). Suppose he oﬀers ﬁrm i a contract, according to
which the ﬁrm receives price pi for each unit it delivers and has to payto consumers
compensation ϕi for each undelivered unit. Then revenue of the ﬁrm is given by
R(pi,ϕ i,min(Yi,Q i),(Yi − Qi)+)=pi min(Yi,Q i) − ϕi(Yi − Qi)+.
We will show that for a certain speciﬁcation of pi and ϕi this contract will lead to
the optimal outcome for any a and b.
6.3 Solving the problem
The problem described in section 6.1 will be solved in a number of stages.86 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
First, we consider total welfare maximization and ﬁnd the sociallyoptimal
amount of capacityto be installed, as well as the sociallydesirable level of reli-
abilityof supply . Then we analy ze the problem of the consumers purchasing service
y under the capacityconstraint, and ﬁnd the preferred level of capacityfor anygiven
p and ϕ. Finally, we consider the ﬁrm’s problem and obtain a necessary condition
on p and ϕ to achieve the sociallydesirable level of reliabilityof services. This
condition will be used to express the participation constraint as a constraint on the
minimum price.
6.3.1 Total welfare maximization
Let us consider a speciﬁc region. In this subsection we drop subscript i corresponding
to the region to simplifythe notation. For a and b, given capacity Q (a ￿ Q ￿ b),
the expected surplus of the consumers in this region is equal to
E[S]=E[κY − κmin(y − Q)+ − R]=
= κE [Y ]− κ
￿
[Q,b]
(Y − Q)dF(Y ) − E[R].
Here, E = EY |a,b.
The expected utilityof the ﬁrm is
E[U
f]=E[R]− (1 + r)I + ωδQ.
Therefore total welfare is determined by
E[S]+E[U
f]=κE [Y ]− κ
￿
[Q,b]
(Y − Q)dF(Y ) − (1 + r)(c + δ)Q + ωδQ. (6.3)
The maximization of (6.3) with respect to (δ,Q) taking values from R+×[a,b] gives
the following conditions on the maximum
δ =0
κ(1 −F(Q)) = (1 + r)c,
from which we obtain the sociallyoptimal capacitylevel
Q
∗ = F
−1
￿
1 −
(1 + r)c
κ
￿
. (6.4)6.3. Solving the problem 87
The conditions deﬁning the maximum have the standard interpretation. First, it is
never optimal to have slack δ positive. Second, the expected marginal beneﬁts of
having an extra unit of capacityare equal to the marginal cost of its installation.
Note that each level of capacity Q corresponds to a certain reliabilityof supply
ρ =P r {Y< Q } = F(Q). From (6.4) we can obtain that the sociallyoptimal
reliabilityof supplyis determined as ρ∗ = F(Q∗)=1−
(1+r)c
κ < 1.
6.3.2 Consumer’s surplus maximization under a capacity
constraint
Let us now consider the optimal outcome from the point of view of consumers alone.
Assume that the region i purchases service from the regulated ﬁrm at price pi and
gets compensated for each undelivered unit byﬁxed amount ϕi ￿ 0. The amount
of y available for the purchase is restricted bythe amount of capacityinstalled, Qi.
Given pi, ϕi and the available capacity Qi (a ￿ Qi ￿ b) the expected consumer’s
surplus conditional on (a,b)i s
EY |a,b[Si]=κE [Y ]− EY−i|a,b
￿
[a,b]
(pi min(Qi,Y i)+( κ − ϕi)(Yi − Qi)+)dF(Yi)=
= κE [Y ]− EY |a,b[piYi]− EY−i|a,b
￿
[Qi,b]
(κ − ϕi − pi)(Yi − Qi)dF(Yi).
Here notation −i stands for all the other regions j =1 ,...N, j ￿= i.
If pi +ϕi <κthis function is maximized at Qi = b.I fpi +ϕi >κthe maximum
is reached at Qi = a. As shown in the previous section, these levels of capacitydo
not maximize total welfare.
In the special case in which pi + ϕi = κ, the desirable Qi is anynumber within
the interval [a,b]. The consumer’s compensation for nondeliveryis exactlyequal to
the utilityloss caused byit and the surplus is alway s expressed by Si =( κ − pi)Yi,
no matter what amount of capacityis available.
6.3.3 Problem of the ﬁrm
In this subsection we consider the solution of the regulated ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization
problem and combine it with the results of social welfare maximization. This will
allow us to formulate the conditions on prices and ﬁnes required to achieve the social
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If the regulator oﬀers a ﬁrm a contract, according to which the ﬁrm receives
price p for each unit it delivers and has to payto consumers compensation ϕ for
each undelivered unit, then the ﬁrm with capacity Q gets utility Uf = pmin(Y,Q)−
ϕ(Y − Q)+ − (1 + r)I + ωδQ.
Suppose the regulator delinks prices and ﬁnes from the own cost of the ﬁrm.
That is, when designing the optimal contract, he speciﬁes p and ϕ as functions
of the observed performance of other ﬁrms, not the performance of the ﬁrm itself.
Then for each ﬁrm i the correspondent pi and ϕi are independent of the investment
incurred byﬁrm i, Ii. We will show this will motivate the ﬁrm to eliminate slack.13
Given the speciﬁcation of pi and ϕi, the ﬁrm i’s expected utilityis as follows
EY |a,b[U
f
i ](δi,Q i)=EY |a,b[pimin(Yi,Q i) −ϕi(Yi − Qi)+] −
−(1 + r)(c + δi)Qi + ωδiQi =
= EY−i|a,b
￿
￿
[a,b]
piYidF(Yi) −
￿
[Q,b]
(pi + ϕi)(Yi − Qi))dF(Yi)
￿
−
−(1 + r)cQi +( ω −r − 1)δiQi.
If pi + ϕi is a constant, then FOCs with respect to (Qi,δi) give us
δi =0
(pi + ϕi)
￿
[Q,b]
dF(Yi) − (1 + r)c =0 ,
from which we obtain
1 − F(Qi)=
(1 + r)c
pi + ϕi
, (6.5)
and therefore, the amount of capacitythat maximizes ﬁrm i’s expected utilityis
Q
f
i = F
−1
￿
1 −
(1 + r)c
pi + ϕi
￿
. (6.6)
Notice that to derive the above formula we used that the sum pi +ϕi is a constant,
and that pi and ϕi are independent on the actions of company i. However, pi and
ϕi maydepend on the realization of demand in region i.
13In contrast, in case of a rate-of-return regime the allowed revenue would be set equal to the
incurred cost, i.e. R =( 1+r)I, which would lead to π =0a n dUf = ωδQ,g i v i n gn oi n c e n t i v et o
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Remark 6.2 The ﬁrm’s problem considered here has much in common with the
so-called ‘newsboy’s problem’ arising in inventory models, which can be formulated
as follows: given that the total demand over the period is uncertain the dilemma
is to order enough inventory, so that the full potential proﬁt may be realized, but
not too much, so as to avoid losses in excess. (See, e.g., Ravindran et al., 1987,
p.353-356.) The solution of this problem is called a critical ratio policy, since the
optimal amount of inventory depends on the ratio of the potential loss per unsold
item over the sum of potential proﬁt per item sold, loss per item of unmet demand
and loss per unsold item. Our term
(1+r)c
p+ϕ can be interpreted along the same lines,
if we rewrite the denominator as p +[ ϕ − (1 + r)c] + (1 + r)c.
Qf deﬁned above is an increasing function of both p and ϕ. That is, a higher
price set bythe regulator as well as larger ﬁnes for nondel iverywill motivate the
ﬁrm to install more capacity. If the regulator knows the ﬁrm’s production function
(i.e. parameter c) and the opportunitycost of capital r,h ei sa b l et oe n f o r c ea n y
level of reliabilityof supplybysimplychoosing an appropriate pair of p (p does not
depend on the actions of the company) and ϕ, summing up to the corresponding
number in accordance with (6.6). For example, if the regulator would like to achieve
reliabilityof supplyequal to ρ, he should solve 1−ρ =
(1+r)c
p+ϕ and set p+ϕ =
(1+r)c
1−ρ .
In particular the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6.1 The socially optimal level of capacity Q∗ deﬁned by (6.4), can be
achieved by setting p and ϕ such that p + ϕ = κ.
This result resembles the well-known notion of a Pigovian-tax (see Pigou, 1920).
The correct amount of capacitycan be ensured bypenalizing undersupplybythe
value of lost load perceived bythe consumers, so that the potentiallyexternal cost
of inadequate supplyis internalized bythe ﬁrms.
No information other than κ will be necessaryto enforce eﬃcient operation. As
long as prices are delinked from cost, the ﬁrm will have an incentive to eliminate
slack and install the sociallyoptimal amount of capacity . Notice that maintaining
the condition p+ϕ = κ will not onlylead to maximization of total welfare, but will
also protect the consumer from the risk of nondelivery, making sure that at any pi
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6.3.4 Participation constraint
The split of κ between p and ϕ (p + ϕ = κ) is a sheer distributional issue. As p
increases, so does the share of total surplus allocated to the ﬁrm. Since the regulator
protects the interests of consumers and ﬁrms, he would like to minimize payments
to the ﬁrm, while assuring that the ﬁrm earns a nonnegative expected proﬁt. Given
imperfect information the derivation of p becomes a complex task.
Notice that after slack has been eliminated, the ﬁrm’s expected utilitybecomes
equal to the expected proﬁt. The ﬁrm will enter the contract as long as there exists
a level of investment at which its expected proﬁt is nonnegative. Therefore, the
participation constraint of ﬁrm i is reduced to EY |a,bπi(0,Q
f
i ) ￿ 0, from which we
can derive a constraint on the minimum price.
Starting with
EY |a,b[πi](0,Q
f
i ) = (6.7)
= EY−i|a,b


￿
[a,b]
piYidF(Yi) − (ϕi + pi)
￿
[Q
f
i ,b]
(Yi − Q
f
i )dF(Yi)

 −
−(1+r)cQ
f
i ￿ 0
and taking into account that in the welfare maximizing case pi+ϕi = κ and Q
f
i = Q∗,
we obtain that
EY |a,b[πi]=EY |a,b[piYi − κ(Yi − Q
∗)+] −(1 + r)cQ
∗ ￿ 0
and consequently
EY |a,b[piYi] ￿ (1 + r)cQ
∗ + κEY |a,b(Yi − Q
∗)+. (6.8)
Due to demand uncertaintythe minimum piYi is above the cost of capacityto
compensate for the ﬁnes that the ﬁrm mayoccasionallyhave to pay .
6.4 Policy analysis
In the previous section we concluded that the ﬁrm’s choice of capacitydepends on
the sum of prices and ﬁnes. In this section we discuss the impact of varying the
level of the ﬁne for non-deliveryon the c hoice of capacity. The table presented at
the end of this section summarizes the results of the discussion.6.4. Policy analysis 91
6.4.1 Case of ϕ=0 (no ﬁnes)
If ϕ=0, then the price is the onlyinstrument available to the regulator to control
the behavior of the ﬁrm.
If price is set at the lowest possible level, just to cover the cost, p =( 1+r)c,
then according to (6.6) the ﬁrm response will be to install Qf = a. This will lead
to the lowest possible quality, since according to our assumptions the realization of
Y will always be greater or equal to a.
At any p<κthe capacityis less than sociallyoptimal. Firms underinvest. By
increasing the price up to κ the regulator can enforce the sociallyoptimal capacity
level and thus to maximize the total welfare. However, at p = κ all surplus goes to
the ﬁrm, leaving the consumer with zero net surplus from having this ﬁrm.
6.4.2 Case of ϕ ￿ κ
Since p>0, then p + ϕ>κ , it follows that Qf >Q ∗ and the ﬁrm will overinvest.
Nevertheless, onlybysetting inﬁnitelylarge ﬁnes the regulator ensures that the ﬁrm
chooses to install the highest level of capacity(i.e. the capacitycorresponding to the
100% reliability), since Qf <bfor anyﬁnite ϕ. If the regulator has no information
on κ and considers perfect reliabilityas being the ideal outcome for customers, he
mayset severe punishment for nondeliveryand force the ﬁrms to install full capacity .
Let us consider this special case as an illustration.
If ϕ = ∞ , then Qf = b and E[π]=E[pY − (1 + r)cb]. The ﬁrm breaks even if
p =( 1+r)cb/E [Y ]=pmin. (6.9)
Note that the regulator can observe the realized values of I and Y for all the ﬁrms,
but does not have information on the technological parameter c and the upper
boundaryof the demand distribution b. Since (1 + r)cb/E [Y ]=( 1+r)I/E[Y ] ￿
(1+r)E[I/Y], the regulator can estimate pmin bytaking a sample average of the
other’s ﬁrm observations. That is, for any i we obtain pi =( 1+r) 1
(N−1)
￿
j￿=i
Ij
Yj. The
term corresponding to the observation i is excluded from the sum, because above
we assumed that pi does not depend on Yi for any i.
We should note that regulatoryschemes assigning veryhigh penalties for inad-
equate performance maybe unrealistic in that theymaybankrupt the company ,
which in practice most regulators would prefer to avoid. In the next section we turn
to a more realistic case.92 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
6.4.3 Case of 0 <ϕ<κ
The sociallyoptimal level of Q can be ensured bysetting ϕ = κ − p. This will lead
to Q = Q∗,δ= 0 and to the maximum level of total welfare. To pass all the beneﬁts
to the consumers the regulator should set the price just to satisfythe participation
constraint. We reformulate condition (6.8) as pmin =( 1+r)I/Y +κE(Y −Qf)+/Y.
Under incomplete information, the regulator has to estimate this value on the basis
of the other ﬁrms’ observed data.
The necessaryinformation includes data on demand, undelivered units and in-
vestment. As before, this can be done bytaking sample statistics. We will el aborate
on this in the next section.
Table 6.4.1. Summaryof the policyanaly sis
ϕ =0 0<ϕ<κ ϕ￿ κ
Q underinvestment if p<κ optimal if ϕ + p = κ overinvestment
δ eliminated eliminated eliminated
pmin (1 + r)c (1 + r)I/Y + κE(Y −Qf)+/Y (1 + r)cb/E [Y ]
6.5 Discussion of yardstick competition under un-
certain demand
In this section we discuss the application of yardstick competition and propose a
compensation scheme that will encourage the elimination of slack and the installa-
tion of the sociallyoptimal capacity .
In practice the true technologylevel of the ﬁrm is often unknown to the regulator.
Therefore, c has to be estimated. Suppose there were no demand uncertainty, then
given the data on cost and output, the regulator could deﬁne a reasonable yardstick
for the price of ﬁrm i as
pi =( 1+r)￿ ci, (6.10)
in which ￿ ci can be estimated from observations on the performance of other ﬁrms6.5. Discussion of yardstick competition under uncertain demand 93
in the same industry.14 In particular, ￿ ci can be deﬁned either as an average (as
proposed in Shleifer, 1985)
￿ ci =
1
N − 1
￿
j￿=i
Ij
Yj
(6.11)
or as the minimum (as in Bogetoft, 1994)
￿ ci =m i n
j￿=i
￿
Ij
Yj
￿
. (6.12)
Now let us suppose that future demand is uncertain. Then the output, which rep-
resents what has actuallybeen delivered, is conditional on capacityand equal to
min(Qj,Y j). Incorporating this adjustment in the above formulae, we obtain
￿ ci =
1
N − 1
￿
j￿=i
Ij
min(Qj,Y j)
(6.13)
or
￿ ci =m i n
j￿=i
￿
Ij
min(Qj,Y j)
￿
. (6.14)
While both schemes provide an estimate of the true cost parameter c, neither will be
optimal when there is uncertaintyabout demand. For example, if the compensation
scheme is based on (6.14), the ﬁrm that achieved the minimum investment per
unit delivered, and therefore has installed the least excess capacity, earns a non-
negative proﬁt, while proﬁts of all the other ﬁrms are negative. As a response to
such a compensation scheme regulated ﬁrms will eventuallydecrease capacity , to
maximize the utilization of their assets. This means that the ﬁrms will underinvest.
In particular, the following proposition can be proved.
Proposition 6.2 A regulatory scheme combining ‘no-ﬁne’-regime with (6.10), in
which ￿ ci’ s are deﬁned by either (6.13) or (6.14) leads to underinvestment and conse-
quently to low reliability of supply. In particular, it supports Qi = ai (i = 1,2,...,N)
as a Nash equilibrium.
14Alternatively, the regulator can use an engineering cost-proxy model as for example is applied
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the regulator of the telecom industry in the
US. However, this approach does not eliminate the need for data on other ﬁrms. Cost-proxy models
should be calibrated on other ﬁrms’ data. (See Gasmi et al., 1999.)94 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
As discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, the optimal level of capacityis achieved
when p+ϕ = κ and pY ￿ (1+r)I +κE(Y −Qf)+. Therefore, the regulator should
set prices in accordance with this formula. Following Shleifer (1985), we applythe
idea of yardstick competition based on the average of other ﬁrms’ observations and
estimate the latter expression bytaking the sample statistics.
Proposition 6.3 The optimal compensation scheme can be speciﬁed as follows: for
every i
Ri = pimin(Yi,Q i) − ϕi(Yi −Qi)+,
in which
pi = min{κ,(1 + r)I−i/Yi + κ((Y − Q)+)−i/Yi} (6.15)
ϕi = κ − pi. (6.16)
Here ‘bars’ denote average of the other ﬁrms’ observations, for example,
x−i =
1
N − 1
￿
j￿=i
xj. (6.17)
Since ﬁrms are exposed to the risk of a (stochastic) shortfall, the individual
rationalityconstraint is not met if a ﬁrm does not receive a mark-up to compensate
for this risk. The scheme speciﬁed in Proposition 6.3 guarantees the ﬁrm revenue
Ri =( 1 + r)I−i+κ((Y −Q)+)−i−ϕ(Yi−Qi)+, which means that a ﬁrm should receive
a price exceeding the minimum cost of installing a unit of capacity. The mark-up
κ((Y − Q)+)−i is based on the average number of units non-delivered bythe other
companies. It is needed to compensate for the risk of ﬁnes. A companyfaces a
trade-oﬀ between increasing reliabilityand the cost of installing extra capacity .
Note that the regulator is able to achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome without actually
knowing a,b and c. He onlyknows that a,b and c are the same for all ﬁrms and
that the Yi are independentlyand identicallydistributed.
Remark 6.3 Proposition 6.3 can be generalized for the case of diﬀerent-size re-
gions, under the assumption that
a
b is constant across regions. Then the demand
distribution in each region i of size si is given by Fi(Yi):[ ai,b i] → [0,1], Fi(Yi)=
￿ F
￿
Yi−ai
bi−ai
￿
, where ai and bi are expressed as ai = asi, bi = bsi. The only adjust-
ment to the scheme will be the incorporation of weights into formula (6.17) so that
x−i =
1
N−1
￿
j￿=i
si
sjxj.6.6. Conclusion 95
6.6 Conclusion
Focusing on the regulation of regional distribution utilities operating under similar
circumstances and able to achieve the same minimum cost, we show how traditional
yardstick competition can be augmented to resolve the trade-oﬀ between price and
reliabilityof service. We propose a regulation scheme that incorporates the aspect
of capacitychoice under uncerta inty. The scheme allows the regulator to enforce the
desired level of investment, corresponding to the socially-optimal level of reliability
of supply, and allocate the welfare gains to the customers.
We show that a scheme that does not penalize network failures, is suboptimal
and leads to underinvestment. In contrast, the socially-optimal outcome can be
achieved byintroducing penalties for undersupplyequal to the customer value of
the associated losses. Then the potentiallyexternal costs of inadequate supply
are internalized bythe companies and hence taken into account in making their
investment decisions.
In our model companies are exposed to the risk of a shortfall. In order that the
individual rationalityconstraint under demand uncertaintyis met, the regulator
should therefore oﬀer a ﬁrm an expected price which exceeds the minimum cost
of installing a unit of capacity. We have suggested how this markup, which is
associated with the risk of undersupplymight be quantiﬁed bya regulator when
there is asymmetric information.
6.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6.2
According to our assumptions p<κ(otherwise there is no sense to have this ﬁrm
at all), therefore, Qf <Q ∗ always holds, implying underinvestment. In particular,
if all other ﬁrms j, j ￿= i, invest aj, both above formulae (6.13) and (6.14) lead to
￿ ci = c, and consequentlyto pi =( 1+r)ci, which can be sustainable onlyat Qi = ai.
Proof of Proposition 6.3
It has alreadybeen shown that as long as pi is independent of the actions of the
company i and the ﬁnes are set as ϕi = κ−pi the companywill eliminate slack and96 6. The model of yardstick competition of network utilities
install the welfare maximizing amount of capacity. What is left to be shown is that
pi satisﬁes the participation constraint. Combining (6.7) with (6.15) and (6.16) we
obtain
EY1...YN|a,b [πi] = (6.18)
= EY−i|a,b


￿
[a,b]
piYidF(Yi) −
￿
[Q
f
i ,b]
(ϕi + pi)(Yi − Q
∗)dF(Yi)

 − (1 + r)cQ
∗ =
= EY−i|a,b
￿
￿
[a,b]
￿
(1+r)I−i/Yi + κ((Y − Q)+)−i/Yi
￿
YidF(Yi)
￿
−
−κ
￿
[Q
f
i ,b]
(Yi − Q
∗)dF(Yi) −(1 + r)cQ
∗ =
= EY−i|a,b
￿
(1+r)I−i + κ((Y −Q)+)−i
￿
−κEYi|a,b(Yi − Q
∗)+ − (1 + r)cQ
∗. (6.19)
ByProposition 6.1 all ﬁrms j (j ￿= i) make the ﬁrst-best investment. Since the prob-
lem is symmetric, hence for all Qj = Q∗, Ij = cQ∗ and therefore I−i = cQ∗ as well.
Expression (6.18) depends on I−i and ((Y − Q)+)−i and gives us the expectation
conditional on the realization of the other agent’s variables. Since Yi, i =1 ,...N
are i.i.d., then EY−i|a,b((Y − Q)+)−i = EY−i|a,b((Y − Q∗)+)−i = EYi|a,b(Yi − Q∗)+.
Therefore, (6.18) equals to zero, which ﬁnishes the proof.Chapter 7
Summary of the results and
conclusions
In this thesis we consider some issues related to the measurement of productivity
and eﬃciency, and the evaluation of factors contributing to total factor productivity
(TFP) growth.
The ﬁrst part discusses alternative approaches to the TFP growth measurement,
namelythe original approach bySolow (1957), the traditional Index-Numbers and
approaches adopted in Input-Output and DEA literature. We interrelate diﬀerent
measures, identifying the main reasons for their dissimilarities and the conditions
under which the considered methods provide equivalent (or close) measures for TFP
growth. The condition of optimizing behavior appears to be crucial in this re-
spect. It lends theoretical support to the conventional T¨ ornqvist or Fisher indices,
while Malmquist index is free of the assumption of optimizing behavior. Malmquist
indices, therefore, mayincorporate the eﬀect of eﬃciencychange, unlike the conven-
tional indices.
Input-Output framework provides indices of technical changes conceptuallyclose
to the conventional Solow Residual. However, theycan be augmented to factor
in both eﬃciencychange and the terms-of-trade eﬀect. This can be done if the
observable prices are replaced byshadow prices obtained from the optimal allocation
problem. Although, similar to DEA, the eﬃciencyis interpreted as the potential
for boosting the production to reach the production possibilityfrontier, there is an
important diﬀerence in the meaning of the frontier in the two models. In DEA the
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potential is determined bythe observable best practice (possiblyachieved bythe
other market participants), while in the augmented input-output model it comes
from improving allocations of production factors within a multi-sectoral economy.
The two empirical applications considered in the ﬁrst part of the thesis deal with
the measurement of productivitygrowth in industrialized countries.
In the ﬁrst we applya method for estimation of TFP growth in a sy stem of a
few economies, based solelyupon changes in the fundamentals of the economies.
Since the economies participating in the system are linked by free trade, changes
in tastes, endowments or technologies in anyof them aﬀect valuations of inputs
in all economies and, therefore, inﬂuence TFP growth. Thus international trade
contributes to TFP growth in each economy. TFP growth has been evaluated at
shadow prices and decomposed into three terms, namelythe Solow Residual, eﬃ-
ciencychange, and the eﬀect of change in term of trade.
The theoryhas been applied to estimate the TFP growth in the US, Japan and
Europe (an aggregate of the UK, France and Germany) in 1985-1990. Since the
system encompasses three major open economies, terms of trade are endogenous in
the model. We have found that the Solow Residual corresponding to shadow prices
and optimal activitylevels are stronglycorrelated with the conventional measure
of TFP growth. Japan had the highest aggregate TFP growth over the observed
period. This was achieved mostlybytec hnical change. In contrast, most of the
European TFP growth was due to eﬃciencychange.
The second application uses Malmquist indices to evaluate the TFP growth in
manufacturing in selected OECD countries during the period 1970-1990. To con-
struct the indices we applyboth DEA with contemporaneous frontiers and DEA with
sequential frontiers. It has been demonstrated that both methods produce highly
correlated results for the total measure of TFP growth, but less correlated results
for the decomposition into technical changes and eﬃciencychanges. The sequential
measure takes past information into account and reallocates temporarybackwards
shifts in the productivityof the best-practice countries to the eﬃciencychange com-
ponent, whilst the contemporaneous measure accounts for them as technical regress.
The former is more suitable for measuring technical changes in manufacturing.
The thesis suggests a decomposition of Malmquist indices, which links the two
measures of TFP growth. The new decomposition distinguishes three sources of
TFP growth: technical progress, catching-up and the business cycle.99
The empirical analysis has shown that most productivity increase in manufac-
turing in the OECD countries can be ascribed to technical progress. Five out of
the six considered manufacturing sectors showed little or no catching up. Onlyin
chemicals eﬃciencychanges were substantial. This sector shows the strongest con-
vergence of TFP levels. The contribution of the business cycle component of TFP
growth appeared to be negative in most cases.
The second part of the thesis deals with the regulation of a natural monopoly.
Related issues are the evaluation of the productivityand eﬃciencyperformance of
regulated companies and the design of a regulation scheme that provides incentives
for adequate performance.
Focusing on the regulation of regional distribution utilities operating under sim-
ilar circumstances and able to achieve the same minimum cost, it has been shown
how the traditional yardstick competition scheme can be augmented to resolve the
trade-oﬀ between price and reliabilityof service. The suggested regulation scheme
incorporates the aspect of capacitychoice under uncertainty . The scheme allows the
regulator to enforce the desired level of investment, corresponding to the socially-
optimal level of reliabilityof supply , and allocate the welfare gains to the customers.
It has been proven that a scheme that does not penalize network failures, is
suboptimal and leads to underinvestment. In contrast, the socially-optimal outcome
can be achieved byintro ducing penalties for undersupplyequal to the customer value
of the associated losses. Then the potentiallyexternal costs of inadequate supply
are internalized bythe companies and hence taken into account in making their
investment decisions.
In the considered model companies are exposed to the risk of a shortfall. There-
fore, in order that the individual rationalityconstraint under demand uncertaintyis
met, the regulator should oﬀer a ﬁrm an expected price which exceeds the minimum
cost of installing a unit of capacity. It has been suggested how this markup, which
is associated with the risk of undersupplymight be quantiﬁed bya regulator when
there is asymmetric information.100 7. Summary of the results and conclusionsBibliography
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Dit proefschrift behandelt de samenhang tussen productiviteitsgroei en eﬃciency.
Daarbij wordt aandacht besteed aan factoren die bijdragen aan productiviteitsgroei.
De groei van de output in een economie wordt volgens de Nobelprijswinnaar Solow
(1957) veroorzaakt door groei van de inputfactoren arbeid en kapitaal en technis-
che vooruitgang; hij toont aan dat de totale factorproductiviteitsgroei (TFP-groei)
gelijk is aan het verschil tussen de groei van output en de groei van input. In de
literatuur is steeds gedebatteerd over de manier waarop TFP groei gemeten kan
worden. In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift worden verschillende methoden om
productiviteitsgroei te meten besproken. Er wordt aangetoond onder welke condities
de verschillende methoden aan elkaar gelijk zijn.
De meer traditionele methoden om TFP te meten (zoals de Index Numbers
methoden) en methoden zoals Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) en Input-Output
Analyse verschillen voornamelijk in de manier waarop prijzen in het model verwerkt
worden. In de traditionele methoden wordt uitgegaan van de veronderstelling dat
prijzen door middel van concurrentie tot stand komen, dat wil zeggen dat productie
verondersteld wordt eﬃci¨ ent te zijn. Dit in tegenstelling tot DEA, dat het mogelijk
ook ineﬃciencyin een bepaalde sector of onderneming te kwantiﬁceren.
Met Malmquist-indices (de met DEA corresponderende methode om TFP groei
uit te drukken) is het mogelijk om productiviteitsgroei in een bepaalde sector te
ontleden in groei van eﬃciencyen technische vooruitgang. De laatste term stemt
overeen met de technische vooruitgang in het model dat door Solow ontwikkeld is.
In DEA kan de productiviteit vergroot worden door in een bepaalde sector eﬃci¨ enter
om te gaan met de productiefactoren arbeid en kapitaal.
Input-Output Analyse is door Ten Raa en Mohnen (2001) in een algemeen
evenwichtsmodel toegepast en maakt het mogelijk om verschillende sectoren in een
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economie en haar internationale omgeving met elkaar te vergelijken. In hun model
kan de eﬃciencyin een bepaalde economie vergroot worden door productiefactoren
anders te alloceren tussen de sectoren van een economie. Het model genereert indices
met betrekking tot technische verandering. Deze indices zijn conceptueel vergelijk-
baar met het Solow residual. Daarnaast kan de TFP groei in dit model worden
onderscheiden in eﬃciencyveranderingen en ruilvoet-eﬀecten.
Zowel in DEA als in de Input-Output Analyse kan ineﬃciency worden ge¨ ınterpreteerd
als het onbenutte potentieel te verbeteren ten opzichte van de productiemogelijkheden-
grens. Er is echter een belangrijk verschil tussen de modellen in de manier waarop
de grens van de productiemogelijkheden wordt bepaald. In DEA wordt de grens
bepaald door de best presterende geobserveerde eenheid, terwijl in de Input-Output
Analyse de grens wordt gevonden door de allocatie van productie factoren te ver-
beteren.
In dit proefschrift worden zowel DEA als Input-Output Analyse empirisch toegepast.
Ten eerste wordt in een algemeen evenwichtsmodel om productiviteitsgroei te meten
toegepast op de drie grote economie¨ en in de periode 1985-1990, namelijk de Verenigde
Staten, Japan en Europa. Omdat deze economie¨ en door een stelsel van vrijhandel
met elkaar verbonden zijn, dragen veranderingen in consumentensmaak, produc-
tiefactoren , of technologie bij aan de TFP groei. Het model is gebaseerd op de
gemeten veranderingen in deze ‘fundamentals’ van de betrokken economie¨ en. De
TFP groei in dit model wordt ontleed in technische verandering (het Solow resid-
ual), eﬃciencyverandering en de verandering in de ruilvoet.
De hoogste TFP groei in deze periode wordt in de Japanse economie gemeten.
Deze groei wordt met name veroorzaakt door technische verandering. De groei in
Europa wordt met name veroorzaakt door eﬃciencyverbeteringen.
Het in het model gemeten Solow Residual is sterk gecorreleerd met de residuals
zoals die op de conventionele manier gemeten worden.
In de tweede toepassing worden Malmquist indices gebruikt om de productiviteit-
groei te meten in de industrietakken van een aantal OESO landen in de periode
1970-1990. Om de indices te kunnen construeren wordt gebruikt gemaakt van DEA
met een sequenti¨ ele bepaling van de grens van de productiemogelijkheden en DEA
met een gelijktijdige bepaling van de grens van de productiemogelijkheden. In het
proefschrift wordt aangetoond dat de methoden een sterke correlatie kennen met
betrekking tot de totale productiviteitsgroei, maar een veel minder sterke correlatie
met betrekking tot de elementen waarin de totale productiviteitsgroei kan worden111
onderscheiden. Bij de gelijktijdige bepaling van de grens van de productiemogelijkhe-
den wordt een achteruitgang van de grens beschouwd als technische achteruitgang.
De sequenti¨ ele bepaling houdt als het ware informatie uit het verleden vast en vat
een achteruitgang van de gelijktijdige grens op als eﬃciencyverandering. Omdat
technische achteruitgang niet echt voor de hand ligt in de industrie, is de laatste
methode meer geschikt om de technische vooruitgang te meten.
In dit proefschrift wordt de productiviteitsgroei ontleed in technische vooruit-
gang, het inhalen van een eﬃciencyachterstand en een conjuncturele component.
Door het laatste component worden beide methoden aan elkaar verbonden. De em-
pirische analyse laat zien dat de productiviteitsgroei in de industrie in de OESO
landen voornamelijk wordt veroorzaakt door technische vooruitgang. Vijf van de
zes in de beschouwing betrokken sectoren toonden niet of nauwelijks sprake van
convergentie van eﬃciencyscores. Alleen in de chemische sector was er sprake van
substanti¨ ele eﬃciencyveranderingen. In deze sector co nvergeert het niveau van pro-
ductiviteit sterk. De bijdrage van de business cycle in productiviteitsgroei lijkt in
de meeste gevallen negatief.
In het eerste deel van het proefschrift wordt verondersteld dat afwijkingen van
concurrentie leiden tot ineﬃciency. In het tweede deel van het proefschrift wordt
aandacht besteed aan de mogelijkheid om in een sector waarin per deﬁnitie geen
competitie mogelijk is (door het bestaan van natuurlijke monopolies) de eﬃciency
te vergroten door het reguleren van de prijzen. Het is mogelijk om natuurlijke
monopolies te prikkelen om hun eﬃciencyte vergroten door het organiseren van
artiﬁci¨ ele competitie (zogenaamde maatstafconcurrentie).
Het in het proefschrift beschreven model gaat uit van informatie asymmetrie
tussen de ‘principaal’ (de regulator die de prijzen vast stelt) en de ‘agenten’ (re-
gionale monopolies die een aan hen gedelegeerde taken uitvoeren, onder vergelijk-
bare omstandigheden). De taken van de ‘agenten’ hebben betrekking op het leveren
van netwerkdiensten. De kwaliteit van de dienstverlening is afhankelijk van onom-
keerbare investeringen in de capaciteit. De investeringsbeslissing wordt genomen
onder onzekerheid over de ontwikkeling van de vraag.
In het systeem van maatstafconcurrentie is de prijs die een regionaal monopolie
haar klanten maximaal in rekening mag brengen niet afhankelijk van de eigen kosten
van de ‘agent’, maar wordt hij gebaseerd op de prestatie van de andere, vergelijkbare,
regionale monopolies.
Maatstafconcurrentie geeft zulke sterke prikkels om de eﬃciencyte vergroten112 Samenvatting
door kostenverlagingen, dat de eﬃciencywinst ten koste kan gaan van de l ever-
ingszekerheid. In het proefschrift wordt aangetoond dat als het systeem van maat-
stafconcurrentie wordt uitgebreid met een samenhangend systeem van boetes en
beloningen, de ‘agenten’ een optimale kwaliteit van dienstverlening zullen leveren.
Daarbij worden de welvaartswinsten die bereikt worden door eﬃciencywinsten en
kwaliteitsverbeteringen doorgegeven aan de afnemers.
In het proefschrift wordt bewezen dat als er geen of een te lage boete wordt
opgelegd voor het niet leveren van diensten als gevolg van onvoldoende capaciteit,
de ‘agenten’ in een systeem van maatstafconcurrentie onvoldoende capaciteit zullen
installeren. Als de ‘regulator’ de boetes te hoog vast stelt, leveren de agenten ook
geen optimale kwaliteit, doordat ze in dat geval op kosten van de afnemers teveel
capaciteit zullen installeren.
De optimale uitkomst kan worden bereikt als de boetes voor niet levering gelijk
zijn aan het verlies aan nut voor de afnemer. Daardoor wordt het externe eﬀect van
kwaliteit ge¨ ınternaliseerd in de investeringsbeslissing van de ‘agent’.
In het beschreven model wordt het investeringsrisico en het risico voor niet lev-
ering gedragen door de ‘agenten’. De ‘agenten’ verlangen een opslag op de minimum
kosten voor het installeren van een eenheid capaciteit om het risico van eventuele
boetes te kunnen dragen. In het proefschrift wordt beschreven op welke manier deze
opslag gekwantiﬁceerd kan worden.